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BETWEEN LAW AND MARKETS: IS THERE A ROLE FOR
CULTURE AND ETHICS IN FINANCIAL REGULATION?
BY DAN AWREY, WILLIAM BLAIR AND DAVID KERSHAW~a
The limits of markets as mechanisms for constraining socially
suboptimal behaviorare well documented. Simultaneously, conventional
approaches toward the law and regulationare often crude and ineffective
mechanismsfor containingthe social costs of marketfailure. So where do
we turn when both law and marketsfail to live up to their socialpromise?
Two possible answers are culture and ethics. In theory, both can help
constrain socially undesirable behavior in the vacuum between law and
markets. In practice,however, both exhibit manifest shortcomings.
To many, this analysis may portend the end of the story. From our
perspective, however, it represents a useful point of departure. While
neither law nor markets may be particularlywell suited to serving as "the
conscience of the Square Mile," it may nevertheless be possible to harness
the power ofthese institutionsto carve out a space within which cultureand
ethics-or, combining the two, a more ethical culture-can play a
meaningful role in constrainingsocially undesirable behavior within the
financialservices industry. The objective ofthis articleis to explore some of
the ways which, in our view, this might be achieved.
This exploration takes place across two dimensions. In the first
dimension, we hold constantthe core internalgovernance arrangementscorporate objectives, directors' duties, board composition, committee
structures, and remuneration policies-withinfinancial institutions. We
then examine how the law and markets might be leveraged to engender a
more ethical culture in two important areas: bilateral counterparty
arrangements and socially excessive risk-taking. More specifically, we
examine how "process-oriented"regulation,backed by a crediblethreat of
both public enforcement and reputationalsanctions,might be employed with
a view to reframingpersonal ethical choices andfosteringa more ethical
organizationalculture withinfinancialservicesfirms.

.Dan Awrey is a University Lecturer in Law & Finance at Oxford University and a Fellow
of Linacre College, Oxford; Sir William Blair is a Judge of the High Court of England and Wales;
and David Kershaw is a Professor of Law at the London School of Economics. The authors would
like to thank John Armour, Thomas C. Baxter, Jr., Raj Bhala, Sir Ross Cranston, Justice Randy
Holland, and the participants at seminars hosted by University College London and Oxford
University for their very helpful comments on earlier versions of this article and Tucker McCarthy
for superb research assistance.
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Intuitively, we would expect the success of this strategy to be a
function of the incentives generated by existing internal governance
arrangements. Lamentably, however, many of these arrangements give
primacy to thefinancial interestsofshareholdersandmanagers over those
of other stakeholders including,perhaps most importantly, society. In the
second dimension, therefore, we examine how we might cultivate a more
ethical culture through reforms of the core governance arrangementsof
financialinstitutions.
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INTRODUCTION

The limits of markets as mechanisms for constraining socially
suboptimal behavior and outcomes are numerous and well documented.'
Simultaneously, conventional approaches toward the law and regulation are
often crude and ineffective mechanisms for containing-let alone
preventing-the social costs of market failure. So where do we turn when
both law and markets fail to live up to their social promise? Two possible
answers are culture and ethics.' In theory, both can play an important role
as extra-contractual or extra-legal gap fillers by helping to constrain socially
undesirable activities in the vacuum between law and markets.' In practice,
however, the impact of culture as a constraint on socially undesirable
behavior is often muted where market participants are numerous,
autonomous, and dispersed, and where the interests of market actors
diverge.' The internal and subjective nature of ethics, meanwhile, renders
their normative content notoriously difficult to reconcile at the individual
level-let alone build meaningful consensus around.' We might thus predict
that both culture and ethics would prove to be relatively impotent
mechanisms for constraining opportunistic behavior, excessive risk-taking,
and other socially undesirable activities within the financial services
industry. Indeed, this prediction is supported not only by logic, but also
experience. From Bankers Trust' and Enron,' to ABACUS, Libor,' and the

'See, e.g., Marion Fourcade & Kieran Healy, Moral Views ofMarket Society, 33 ANN. REV.
Soc. 285, 291-305 (2007) (summarizing recent theoretical literature).
2See infra Part I.A (mapping the distinction between "cultural," "commercial,"
and other
norms, on one hand, and personal "ethics" on the other).
3
See infra notes 113-16 and accompanying text (synthesizing from empirical research the
traits of effective cultural norms).
4See infra notes 121-134 and accompanying text (providing evidence of limited behavioral
impact of cultural norms in the financial services industry).
5See infra note 81 and accompanying text (noting the difficulty of modeling or measuring
personal ethics).
6
See In re Missner, Exchange Act Release No. 33-7124,34-35136, SEC Docket 1145 (Dec.
22, 1994); In re BT Sec. Corp., CTFC Docket No. 95-3, 1994 WL 711224 (Dec. 22, 1994); BT
Securities CensuredandFined$10 Millionfor AntifraudandReportingViolations Relatingto the
Sales ofDerivatives, 94-243 SEC NEWS DIGEST, Dec. 22, 1994, availableat http://www.sec.gov/
news/digest/digarchives/digarchl994.shtml; Kelley Holland, Linda Himelstein & Zachary Schiller,
The Bankers Trust Tapes, BUSINESSWEEK, Oct. 16, 1995, http://www.businessweek.com/1995/
42/b34461.htm.
7
See, e.g., BETHANY MCLEAN & PETER ELKIND, THE SMARTEST Guys INTHE ROOM: THE
AMAZING RISE AND SCANDALOUS FALL OF ENRON 18-21 (2004) (discussing how Enron used

profit shifting in hopes of showing "Wall Street that it could produce steadily increasing earnings");
FRANK PARTNoY, INFECTIOUS GREED: How DECEIT AND RISK CORRUPTED FINANCIAL MARKETS

30 (2003) (recalling how Enron was one of the companies "accused of inflating revenues and
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breaches of U.S. money laundering regulations by HSBC and Standard
Chartered," recent financial history is replete with examples of what
regulators, politicians, business, and religious leaders have all recognized
as," at least in part, cultural and ethical failures.
To many, this analysis may portend the end of the story. From our
perspective, however, it represents a useful point of departure. While neither
law nor markets may be particularly well suited to serving as "the conscience
of the Square Mile" (or Wall Street, Frankfurt or Hong Kong), it may
nevertheless be possible to harness the power of these institutions to carve
out a space within which culture and ethics-or, combining the two, a more
ethical culture"-can be fostered and come to play a meaningful role in
constraining undesirable conduct and practices within the financial services

reducing expenses to meet quarterly earnings targets").
8
See SEC v. Goldman Sachs & Co., Litig. Release No. 21489 (April 16, 2010),
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2010/lr21489.htm; Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exchange
Comm'n, Goldman Sachs to Pay Record $550 Million to Settle SEC Charges Related to Subprime
Mortgage CDO (July 15, 2010), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-123.htm; Press Release,
Fin. Servs. Auth., FSA Fines Goldman Sachs Int'l £17.5 Million for Weaknesses in Controls to
Provide FSA with Appropriate Info. (Sept. 9,2010), http/www.fsa.gov.uk/library/communication/
pr/2010/141.shtni.
9
See Press Release, Fin. Servs. Auth., Barclays Fined £59.5 Million for Significant Failings
in relation to LIBOR and EURIBOR (June 27,2012), http://www.fsa.gov.uk/library/communication
/pr/2012/070.shtml; Press Release, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, CFTC Orders
Barclays to Pay $200 Million Penalty for Attempted Manipulation of and False Reporting
Concerning LIBOR and Euribor Benchmark Interest Rates (June 27, 2012),
http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr6289-12; Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice,
Barclays Bank PLC Admits Misconduct Related to Submissions for the London Interbank Offered
Rate and the Euro Interbank Offered Rate and Agrees to Pay $160 Million Penalty (June 27, 2012),
http://www.justice.gov/opalpr/2012/June/12-crm-815.html.
'oSee HSBC's Grilling: What Comes Out in the Wash, THE ECONOMIST, July 21, 2012,
http://www.economist.com/node/21559349; Jessica Silver-Greenberg, BritishBank in $340 Million
Settlement for Laundering, N.Y. TIMES, (Aug. 14, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com
/2012/08/15/business/standard-chartered-settles-with-new-york-for-340-million.html?pagewanted
=all&_moc.semityn.www.
"See infra note 149; see also Emiliya Mychasuk, Money andMorals, FIN. TIMES (London),
Oct. 24, 2009, at 13 (reporting on a seminar for financial sector leaders conducted by the Archbishop
of Westminster); Jonathan Sacks, Has EuropeLost its Soul to the Markets?, TIMES (London), Dec.
12, 2011, at 22 (arguing to revitalize Judeo-Christian foundations of markets to develop an ethical
culture). See generallyWILLIAM BLAIR, STANDARDS AND THE RULE OF LAW AFTER THEGLOBAL
FINANCIAL CRISIS in INTERNATIONAL MONETARY AND FINANCIAL LAW: THE GLOBAL CRISIS 97

(Mario Giovanoli & Diego Devos eds., 2010) (suggesting that the "governance of the international
financial system will lack the necessary ethical underpinning to enable real progress to higher
standards").
12Howard Davies, Chairman, Fin. Servs. Auth., Are Words Still Bonds: How Straight is the
City?, Address Before the Securities Institute Ethics Committee: 3rd Annual Lecture (Nov. 2, 1998),
available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/library/communication/speeches/1998/spl8.shtml.
"As described in greater detail in Part IV,our use of the term "ethical culture" is motivated
by the inherent "chicken and egg" problem vis-h-vis culture and ethics.
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industry. The objective of this article is to explore some of the ways in
which, in our view, this might be achieved.
This exploration takes place across two dimensions. In the first
dimension, we hold constant the core internal governance arrangementscorporate objectives, directors' duties, board composition, shareholder rights,
and remuneration policies-within financial institutions. We then examine
how regulation and markets might be leveraged to help engender a more
ethical culture in two important areas: (1) bilateral counterparty
arrangements and (2) socially excessive risk-taking. More specifically, we
examine how so-called "process-oriented"'" regulation, backed by a credible
threat of both public enforcement and market-based reputational sanctions,
might be employed with a view to reframing personal ethical choices and
fostering a more ethical organizational culture within financial services
firms.
Intuitively, we would expect the success of this strategy to be a
function of the incentive structures generated by the existing constellation of
internal governance arrangements." Put simply, for ethical frameworks to
have traction within organizational culture and decision-making they must be
given room to breathe. Yet the existing governance arrangements within
financial institutions in many jurisdictions directly or indirectly (to differing
degrees) give primacy to the financial interests of shareholders and, thereby,
create incentive structures which reward opportunistic behavior and socially
excessive risk-taking." These incentive structures are likely to crowd out
efforts to foster the formation of a more ethical culture." In the second
dimension, therefore, we examine how we might cultivate a more ethical
culture through reforms of the core governance arrangements of financial
institutions.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part III maps out the limits of both
law and markets as mechanisms for governing conduct within the financial
services industry. Part IV then draws out the important distinction between
cultural, commercial, and other norms on the one hand, and personal ethics

14See discussion infra Part III.A (explaining process-oriented regulation and applying it to a
case study).
"See infra note 140 and accompanying text.
'6See infra notes 228-231 and accompanying text explaining why in fmancial institutions in
particular shareholder primacy generates these problematic effects. Generally, on variation in
governance arrangements, see e.g., Sofie Cools, The Real Difference in Corporate Law Between the
United States and Continental Europe: Distribution of Powers, 30 DEL. J.CORP. L. 697, 762 (2005).
7
1 See infra notes 141-45 and accompanying text.
"There is a third dimension, albeit one which resides beyond the scope of this paper,
dealing with structural reforms such as ring fencing and narrow banking.
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on the other, to examine the circumstances in which in theory, each is
likely to act as a meaningful behavioral constraint. It also articulates
the substantive content-essentially a norm of "other regarding"
behavior-animating the more ethical culture we seek to foster. Building on
this examination, Part V explores how it may be possible to generate more
powerful cultural and ethical constraints within the context of bilateral
counterparty relationships. The springboard for this examination will be the
U.K.'s "Treating Customers Fairly Initiative" ("TCF"), a process-oriented
regulatory strategy designed to influence organizational culture surrounding
the provision of retail financial services. Part V also examines the merits
and potential drawbacks of expanding the TCF Initiative to encompass
transactions involving more sophisticated market counterparties. Part VI
then examines whether it may be possible to employ similar process-oriented
strategies to cultivate constraints on socially excessive risk-taking. As we
shall see, the collision of culture, ethics, and systemic risk raise a host of
unique and difficult-to-navigate questions. Finally, moving to the second
dimension, Part VII examines why it might be necessary to reconfigure the
core internal governance arrangements within financial institutions as a precondition to the emergence of meaningful cultural and/or ethical
constraints, and how we might go about doing so.
Ultimately, this paper does not profess to have all the answers.
Rather, it aspires to ask some important and often neglected questions about
the role of culture and ethics in financial regulation and to offer up a
framework for more serious and rigorous discussion.
II. THE LIMITS OF LAW AND MARKETS

A. The Limits of Markets
Markets are good at many things. Most importantly, the price
mechanism aggregates and conveys valuable information to market
participants about the prevailing supply and demand dynamics for a given
asset (along with available substitutes). This information then influences
how these market participants allocate scarce resources and, through their
decisions, the direction of the broader economy." Where markets are
complete and perfectly competitive, the prevailing view is that the
frictionless operation of the price mechanism can be expected to yield a

19See infra notes 21-22.
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Pareto-efficient equilibrium.2' This is the essence of Friedrich Hayek's
"spontaneous ordering."" It is also the theoretical foundation of arguments
which view free and unfettered markets as the optimal means of allocating
society's resources.'
In reality, of course, complete and perfectly competitive markets exist
only in textbooks. Markets have limits. These limits (or market failures) are
encountered where: information is costly and asymmetrically distributed;
competition is imperfect; the existence of public goods results in
underinvestment; and where markets generate negative externalities
imposing costs on third parties. Perhaps nowhere are these limits more
clearly reflected than in the circumstances and events which culminated in
the recent global financial crisis (the "GFC"). In many cases, the complexity
of modem financial markets overwhelmed the powerful incentives of even
the most sophisticated market participants to ferret out and trade on new
information." For example, as Gary Gorton has observed, many market
participants did not fully understand how the unique structure of sub-prime
mortgages (i.e., their short duration, step-up rates, and pre-payment
penalties) made the MBS and CDOs into which they were repackaged
particularly sensitive to volatility in underlying home prices.24 Along a
similar vein, Coval, Jurek, and Stafford have demonstrated how ratings
agencies and other market participants failed to perceive both (1) how the
structure of CDOs (and so-called CDO2) amplified initial errors with respect
to the calculation of default risk on underlying assets, and (2) the systematic
interconnections between these assets." Perhaps more importantly, however,
socially excessive private risk-taking--driven by, inter alia, information

20

See Kenneth AiTow & Gerard Debreu, Existence of an Equilibriumfor a Competitive

Economy, 22 ECONOMETRICA 265, 265 (1954). An allocation of resources among two or more
parties is said to be 'Pareto efficient" where no party can be made better offwithout making at least
one party worse off. Id
21
See FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, INDIVIDUALISM AND ECONOMIC ORDER: THE USE OF

KNOWLEDGE IN SOCIETY 86 (1948) ("The whole acts as one market, not because any of its
members survey the whole field, but because their limited individual fields of vision sufficiently
overlap so that through many intermediaries the relevant information is communicated to all.").
"See id at 77-81.
23
See, e.g., Robert P. Bartlett, III, Inefficiencies in the Information Thicket: A CaseStudy of
Derivative DisclosuresDuringthe FinancialCrisis,36 J. CORP. L. 1, 57 (2010) (demonstrating

how high information costs and low salience of information lead market participants to overlook
valuable trading opportunities).
24

See Gary Gorton, The Panic of2007, 20-34 (Aug. 4,2008), available at http-/www.kc.
frb.org/publicat/sympos/2008/gorton.08.04.08.pdf.
25
See Joshua Coval, Jakub Jurek & Erik Stafford, The EconomicsofStructuredFinance,23
J. OF ECON. PERSP. 3, 23 (2009).
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problems,26 the status of liquidity and financial stability as public goods,"
and the moral hazard and competitive distortions created by the so-called
"too big to fail" ("TBTF") subsidyn-generated huge negative externalities,
the effects of which are still reverberating throughout the global economy. It
should come as no surprise then that much of the post-GFC policy debate
can be distilled to a single question: what should we do when markets fail to
function effectively?
B. The Limits ofFinancialLaw andRegulation
When markets fail we instinctively reach for the regulatory toolbox to
directly address the identified failings. If counterparties are uninformed, we
seek to ensure that they receive more information; if certain activities are
associated with excessive risk-taking, we seek to separate those activities
from core banking functions; if private governance arrangements, such as
Libor, are broken, we seek to fix them through public regulatory
intervention. Although such reforms are important, we need to be cognizant
of the limits of conventional legal and regulatory approaches as tools for
directly addressing these market failures.
As a preliminary and general matter, both public choice and
regulatory capture theory predict that the law may be shaped by powerful
vested interests with little or no regard for broader social welfare.29 Indeed,
to many, these predictions have considerable explanatory power in the
context of the pre-and post-crisis regulation of the financial services
industry."o At the same time, we must not assume the omniscience of public

26See supra notes

23-25.
27See Dirk Schoenmaker, The Financial Trilemma I (Duisenberg Sch. of Fin. - Tinbergen
Inst. Discussion Papers No. TI 11-019/DSF 7, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstractid=1340395. In turn, we would expect this to lead to underinvestment in the
development of risk management infrastructure by both public and private actors.
28
Translating into the failure of TBTF institutions to fully internalize the costs of their
risk-taking. See FSA, THE TURNER REvIEw: A REGULATORY RESPONSE To THE GLOBAL

BANKING CRISIS 95-96 (2009), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/ other/turner review.pdf.
29
See JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT 82,127,
242 (1962); George J. Stigler, The Theory ofEconomic Regulation, 2 BELL J.ECON. & MGMT. SCi.
3, 11-12 (1971); Kenneth J. Arrow, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 119 (2d. ed. 1963);
Duncan Black, On the Rationale of Group Decision-Making,56 J. POL. ECON. 23, 29 (1948).
30

Similarly, ostensibly desirable regulation is susceptible to being diluted over time by

industry lobbying. See, e.g., Sebastian Mallaby, Sombre Spanish Lessons on Fighting Credit

Bubbles, FIN. TIMES (London), June 14, 2012, available at http://www.f.com (search title)
(describing how Spanish dynamic provisioning was watered down in response to industry lobbying);
Saule T. Omarova, FromGramm-Leach-Bliley to Dodd-Frank:The UnfulfiledPromiseofSection

23A of the FederalReserve Act, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1683, 1763-65 (2011) (describing the gradual
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actors. As the GFC has made clear, public regulators often face
acute asymmetries of information and expertise vis-a-vis regulated
constituencies? These asymmetries limit the ability of regulators to
effectively identify and monitor the location, nature, and extent of potential
risks, or design and implement effective regulatory responses.32 As a result,
we must maintain a healthy degree of skepticism respecting the policy
choices of public actors."
Then there is the structure of law itself. It would be extremely costly
in most cases, if not entirely impossible, to articulate legal rules which
envision the entire universe of potential future states of the world." These
costs invariably give rise to gaps between what the law says, on the one
hand, and what its drafters (freed from the shackles of imperfect information,
bounded rationality, and other constraints) would have wanted it to say, on
the other." Simultaneously, legal rules-once established may be are often
inflexible. They are also often over- or under-inclusive." This inflexibility
generates opportunities for creative compliance and regulatory arbitrage by
actors whose incentives are not aligned with regulatory objectives." There is
also the related prospect that prescriptive legal rules will be rendered
anachronistic (or perhaps even harmful) by subsequent developments."
Although broader standards may address some of these problems, their very
generality may portend their ineffectiveness-particularly when interpreted
by actors whose incentive structures are not aligned with regulatory
objectives."
dismantling of section 23A of the U.S. Federal Reserve Act); see also SIMON JOHNSON & JAMES
KWAK, 13 BANKERS: THE WALL STREET TAKEOVER AND THE NEXT FINANCIAL MELTDOWN

(2010) (providing an account of how the industry successfully captured lawmakers in the period
leading up to the GFC); John C. Coffee, Jr., The PoliticalEconomy ofDodd-Frank: Why Financial
Reform Tends to be FrustratedandSystemic RiskPerpetuated,97 CORNELL L. REV. 1019, 1026-27

(2012) (observing similar "downsizing" in connection with the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank
Act]).

3

'Dan Awrey, Regulating FinancialInnovation: A More Principles-BasedProposal?,5

BROOK. J.CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 273, 292 n.92 (2011).
32See Dan Awrey, Complexity, Innovation and the Regulation of Modern Financial

Markets, 2 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 235, 276 (2012)
3

See id.at 276-77.

"See Awrey, supra note 31, at 277.
3See id,
' 6See id.at 292 n.93.
37
See Doreen McBamet, After Enron Will "Whiter than White CollarCrime" Still Wash?,
46 BRIT. J. CRIMrNOLOGY 1091, 1092 (2006).
3

8See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-7 (2012) (requiring U.S. domiciled money market funds to
only hold debt instruments rated by an NRSRO).
39

See Mark W. Nelson, BehavioralEvidence on the Effects ofPrinciples-andRules-Based

Standards, 17 ACCT. HORIZONS 91, 93 (2003).

200

DELAWARE JOURNAL OF CORPORATE LAW

[Vol. 38

Two examples will help illustrate the limits of conventional legal and
regulatory approaches. Consider first the regulatory strategies typically used
to combat potential opportunism stemming from the asymmetries of
information and expertise which pervade modem financial markets. The law
has historically been utilized in one of three (progressively more invasive)
ways to address this problem. The first strategy is to mandate disclosure in
an effort to level the informational playing field.' The second strategy is to
impose a duty on financial intermediaries to act, to a greater or lesser extent,
in the interests of other (less informed) parties." Strategies falling into this
category include both suitability requirements and fiduciary duties. The
third strategy includes various forms of product regulation designed, in
effect, to insulate less informed parties from risks which they may not fully
understand.42
While disclosure may be a necessary condition for efficient private
contracting, it is often not sufficient. This is due, in no small measure, to the
complexity of modem financial markets.43 As Robert Bartlett has observed,

4Consider, for example, some of the disclosure obligations introduced under the DoddFrank Act. The Dodd-Frank Act requires, for example, that a swap dealer or major swap participant
must disclose to any counterparty "information about the material risks and characteristics of the
swap" and any conflicts of interest the swap dealer may have. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111203, § 731, 124 Stat. 1708, 1785 (2010). The Dodd-Frank Act also provides for disclosures by
credit rating agencies in relation to credit ratings by authorizing SEC rules requiring filings
containing information on, for example, "the assumptions underlying the credit rating procedures
and methodologies" and "the data that was relied on to determine the credit rating." Id § 932, 124
Stat. 1879, 1879 (2010). The SEC's Release on Asset Backed Securities issued in 2010 provides
that in relation to structured finance products, the sale agreement for a non-registered private
placement gives the purchaser the right to disclosures from the seller that would be available if the
offering were registered (on form S-I or Form SF-I under the Securities Act of 1933, as am. Pub.
Law 112-106). See Asset-Backed Securities, Exchange Act Release Nos. 33-9117, 34-61858, 98
SEC Docket 460 (Apr. 7, 2010).
41

See FINANCIAL CONDUCT AUTHORITY, CONDUCT OF BUSINESS SOURCEBOOK

§§

3,9

(2013) [hereinafter COBS], available at http://fshandbook.info/FS/html/FCA/COBS (discussing
client categorization and duty of suitability in the U.K.). With regard to suitability requirements in
the United States, see generally Kathleen C. Engel and Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale of Three
Markets: The Law and Economics of PredatoryLending, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1255 (2002) and
Frederick Mark Gedicks, Suitability Claims and Purchases of Unrecommended Securities: An
Agency Theory ofBroker-DealerLiability, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 535 (2005).

42
This could include: (1) prohibiting the sale of more complex financial products and
services to certain informationally disadvantaged parties; (2) mandating simplicity in the structure of
these products or services, see David Scharfstein & Adi Sunderam, The Economics of Housing
FinanceReform 53-54 (Harvard Bus. Sch. & NBER, Working Paper, Aug. 2011), available at
http://www.people.hbs.edu/dscharfstein/Economics of Housing FinanceReform Brookings.pdf);
or (3) implementing ex ante product approval requirements designed to, inter alia, screen out

unnecessary complexity, see Saule T. Omarova, License to Deal: Mandatory Approval ofComplex

FinancialProducts,90 WASH. U. L. REV. 63, 68 (2012).
43
See Awrey, supra note 32, at 237, 242.
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accurately valuing even a single CDO, for example, demands a multi-faceted
analysis of an enormous volume of legal and financial data." The
information costs associated with valuing a portfolio of these instruments,
Citigroup's balance sheet, or the vast array of intricate and constantly
evolving counterparty exposures within the shadow banking system, are
clearly orders of a magnitude higher.45 Viewed from this perspective, what
matters is notjust the availabilityof information in a strictly technical sense,
but also the amount and complexity of this information and, consequently,
the human capital and other endowments necessary to process it in any
meaningful way." Ultimately, it is the asymmetrical distribution of these
endowments which render disclosure, in and of itself, a relatively ineffective
strategy for addressing opportunism within the context of bilateral
counterparty relationships.47
The limits of duty-based strategies stem from the fact that they conflict
with the basic tenets of freedom of contract: the notion that individuals are
entitled to make their own investment decisions which reflect their

(unobservable) preferences. In so doing, such strategies may undermine the
allocative efficiency of markets by (1) restricting individual choice and (2)
eroding the incentives of investors to engage in information and price
discovery. Ultimately, while the resulting costs may be justified where
significant asymmetries of information and expertise exist (i.e., in the retail

"Bartlett, supra note 23, at 3.
45
Broadly speaking, the shadow banking system includes:(I) non-bank financial institutions,
such as finance companies, structured investment vehicles, securities lenders, money market mutual
funds, hedge funds and U.S. government-sponsored entities, and (2) financial instruments, such as
repurchase agreements, asset-backed securities, collateralized debt obligations and other derivatives,
insofar as these institutions and instruments perform economic functions (i.e., maturity, credit and
liquidity transformation) typically associated with more "traditional" banks. See Gary Gorton &
Andrew Metrick, Regulating the Shadow BankingSystem, Brookings Papers on Econ. Activity, Fall

2010, availableat http://www.brookings.edu/-/media/projects/bpea/fall%202010/2010b-bpeagor
ton; Zoltan Pozsar et al., Shadow Banking (Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Staff ReportNo. 458, 2010),
available at http://www.ny.frb.org/research/staff reports/sr458.pdf.
46See generally Awrey, supra note 32, 242-258 (discussing the complexity of modern
financial markets); see also Complaint 17, SEC v. Goldman Sachs & Co., No. 10-CV-3229
(S.D.N.Y. 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2010/ comp21489.pdf
(referring to the statement of an employee of Paulson & Co. in relation to Goldman Sachs's
structuring of the ABACUS transactions: "It is true that the market is not pricing the subprime
RMBS wipeout scenario. In my opinion this situation is due to the fact that rating agencies, CDO
managers and underwriters have all the incentives to keep the game going, while 'real money'
investorshave neitherthe analyticaltools northe institutionalframeworkto take action before the
losses that one could anticipatebased[on]the 'news' available everywhere areactually realized ")

(emphasis added).
47See

Awrey, supra note 32, at 236-37.
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context"), such strategies are more difficult to justify in contexts involving
ostensibly more sophisticated market participants.49
The limits of product regulation, meanwhile, are threefold. First,
defining ex ante the class of parties deemed to be at an informational
disadvantage in respect of a given financial product or service is a difficult
and arbitrary task. While the resulting rules may protect less sophisticated
parties in many cases, they may also be over-inclusive in their application,
arguably impeding the development and spread of new markets for useful
products and services."o Second, the very asymmetries of information and
expertise product regulation is designed to ameliorate may render the public
actors who design and implement these requirements poorly equipped to
identify which products and services pose the greatest risks." Finally, the
market distortions generated by these types of requirements have a long
history of generating unintended, sometimes even adverse, consequences.52
The limits of conventional approaches toward financial law and
regulation can also be observed in the current strategies used to address
socially excessive risk-taking." Capital adequacy regulation, for example,
has been at the forefront of the post-crisis regulatory response. Yet the crisis

48

See COBS, supra note 41, §§ 9.2.1-.2 (referring to the U.K.); see also id. § 10.2
(providing an "appropriateness regime" in relation to non-recommended/advised services which is
again structured around client knowledge and sophistication); 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.1Ob-3, 240.15c25(a)(2) (2012) (focusing on the counterparty's financial situation and needs in the US); Padgett v.
Dapelo, 826 F. Supp. 99, 100 (S.D.N.Y 1993) (observing the counterparty's level of sophistication
and the likelihood that the broker controlled her account); Rolf v. Blyth Eastman Dillon & Co., 424
F. Supp. 1021, 1026-27 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (discussing how there was enough evidence to prove that
the plaintiff kept careful watch over his securities and that he was not an unsophisticated
investor). For a detailed discussion ofthese provisions, see Engel &McCoy, supranote 41, at 1258.
See also Jonathan Macey et al., HelpingLaw Catch Up to Markets: Applying Broker-DealerLaw to

Subprime Mortgages, 34 J.CORP. L. 789, 815 (2009) (observing that "[t]oday, like in the 1930s,
most actions against broker-dealers for suitability and suitability-like violations involve sad stories of
elderly and/or infirm individuals swindled by unscrupulous broker-dealers").
49

See Donald C. Langevoort, Selling Hope, Selling Risk: Some Lessons for Law from
BehavioralEconomics About Stockbrokers andSophisticated Customers,84 CALIF. L. REv. 627,

690 (1996).
50
Simultaneously, of course, they may be under-inclusive: failing to capture the entire
universe of parties in need of protection. See Awrey, supra note 31, at 277.
51
See Yesha Yadav, The Specter of Sisyphus: Re-making International Financial
Regulation After the Global FinancialCrisis, 24 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 83, 110 (2010).
52
See Arnold Kling, Not What They Had in Mind A History ofPolicies That Producedthe

FinancialCrisis of 2008 37 (Mercatus Fin. Mkts. Working Grp., Working Paper No. 1474430,
2009), availableat http://mercatus.org/uploadedFiles/Mercatus/Publications/ NotWhatTheyHadn
Mind.pdf.
53

See Robert F. Weber, New Governance, FinancialRegulation, and Challenges to
Legitimacy: The Example of the Internal Models Approach to CapitalAdequacy Regulation, 62
ADMIN. L. REv. 783, 790 (2010).
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itself has revealed the profound limitations of such regulation-limitations
that some leading regulators are beginning to publicly acknowledge.54 First,
the rigid risk weightings employed under the Basel II framework were
susceptible to arbitrage by financial institutions using structured finance
techniques and their own internal risk models." While Basel III has
removed some of this rigidity," banks are still able to rely on their own
models in assessing asset quality. As a result, arbitrage opportunities still
exist." Yet the obvious alternative is to substitute banks' internal risk
assessments for those of bank supervisors: a strategy which was employed by
Basel I and subsequently rejected as both inflexible and inaccurate. Capital
adequacy regulation can thus be viewed as involving a choice between two
second-best strategies. Second, and partially as a result of these limitations,
reported regulatory capital levels are not always an accurate reflection of
underlying bank solvency." For example, just fifteen days prior to filing for
bankruptcy, Lehman Brothers reported a Tier 1 capital ratio of 11%-7%
higher than the minimum requirement under Basel II.6o Similarly, Northern
Rock was, on paper at least, the best capitalized major U.K. bank just prior
to its demise."

54

See Brooke Masters, HaldaneCallsfor a Rethink ofBaselI, FIN. TIMES (London), Aug.

31, 2012, availableat http://www.ft.com (search title). Andrew Haldane is the Executive Director
for Financial Stability at the Bank of England. Id.
55
See David Jones, EmergingProblems with the Basel CapitalAccord:Regulatory Capital
Arbitrageand Related Issues, 24 J. BANKING & FIN. 35, 42-47 (2000) (describing how financial

institutions utilized structural subordination (i.e., tranching), remote origination (i.e., structured
investment vehicles), and indirect credit enhancement (i.e., structured liquidity facilities) to lower
their regulatory capital requirements without reducing the underlying economic risk).
56
See generally Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Basel III:
A GlobalRegulatory
Frameworkfor More Resilient Banks andBanking Systems, BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS, 29-54

(June 2011), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsl89.pdf (outlining "the reforms to the
counterparty credit risk framework").
57

See Brooke Masters et. al., Fears Rise Over Banks' Capital Tinkering, FIN. TIMES

(London), Nov. 13, 2011, availableat http://www.ft.com (search title) (reporting that "[c]oncern is
growing that banks in Europe and elsewhere are moving to meet new tougher capital requirements
by tinkering with their internal models to make their holdings appear less risky"); Brooke Masters,
Investors Lose Faith in Banks' RWA Models, FIN. TIMES (London), May 23, 2012, availableat

http://www.fi.com (search title).
58

See Ines Drumond, Bank CaptialRequirements, Business Cycle Fluctuationsand the

Basel Accords: A Synthesis, 23 J.ECON. SURVS. 798, 807 (2009) (discussing proposed and actual
changes to Basel II).
59
The other distortion being that Basel II (unlike Basel 1H) did not measure liquidity. See id.
at 812.
60

See Candemir Baltali & Joseph Tanega, Basel III:
DehybridizationofCapital,8 N.Y.U. J.

L. & Bus. 1, 15-16 (2011).
Id. at 15.
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Looking forward, it seems almost inevitable that post-crisis reforms
such as the U.S. "Volcker Rule,"62 the U.K.'s retail ring-fence,6" and the EU's
proposed Liikanen ring-fence, if implemented,64 will also be vulnerable to
regulatory arbitrage. The objective of these reforms is to insulate deposittaking institutions from the risks associated with more speculative
investment banking and proprietary trading activities." At the same time,
however, these reforms contemplate that deposit-taking institutions will still
be permitted to utilize these instruments for risk management (i.e., hedging)
purposes. Yet articulating a comprehensive legal definition of proprietary
trading-and distinguishing such trading from permissible hedging
activities-is far from straightforward. For a salient example, one need look
no further than J.P. Morgan's recent trading loss-estimated to be in the
range of two to five billion dollars' 6-on what was, ostensibly at least, a
hedging transaction." This vulnerability underscores the limits of
conventional regulatory approaches to excessive risk-taking.
Much of the financial regulatory toolbox deployed in response to the
GFC is therefore limited in its likely effectiveness. Perhaps as important, it
is also limited in its outlook. Specifically, these conventional regulatory
responses share a common approach to regulation which attempts to dictate
or directly influence how market participants act." They do not, however,
attempt to mold how people think when they act." Put differently, the

62

See Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. 111-203, § 619, 124 Stat. 1376, 1617 (2010) (amending the
Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, 12 U.S.C. § 1841 et. seq., to add prohibitions on proprietary
trading and certain relationships with hedge funds and private equity funds).
63

See HM TREASURY, BANKING REFORM: DELIVERING STABILITY AND SUPPORTING A

SUSTAINABLE ECONOMY 15 (2012), available at http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/whitepaper_

banking reform 140512.pdf.
"See EU High-Level Group on Reforming the Structure of the EU Banking Sector, Final
Report EUROPEAN COMM'N, 99 §5.5 (2012), availableat http://ec.europa.eu/intemal-market/
bank/docs/high-level expertgroup/report en.pdf. Whether or not this proposal will be implemented
is unclear at the time of writing.
6
sFor example, risks involving positions in OTC derivatives. See infra note 111 and
accompanying text.
66
See Lisa Pollack, Oh, So Now It's a $5bn Loss?, FIN. TIMES BLOG (May 21, 2012, 1:39
PM), http://ftalphaville.ft.com/blog/2012/05/21/1008231/oh-so-now-its-a-5bn-loss/.
67
See Shahien Nasiripour & Tom Braithwaite, JP Morgan FacesFreshProbe,FIN. TIMES
(London), Sept. 6, 2012, available at http://www.ft.comlintl/cms/s/0/5f418ff4-f84a-1lel-bec800144feabdcO.html (reporting the statement from Senator Carl Levin that the ''enormous loss' was
'just that latest evidence that what banks call hedges are often risky bets'); see also Standard
Chartered Bank v. Ceylon Petroleum Corp., [2011] EWHC (Comm) 1785 (Eng.) (illustrating how
difficult it can be to distinguish between speculation and hedging, even following a trial), affd,
[2012] EWCA (Comm) 1049 (Eng.) (noting an arbitral tribunal reached a different conclusion on
similar facts in a claim by Citibank).
65
See infra notes 238-39 and accompanying text.
69
See infra Part III.A.
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conventional regulatory toolbox does not seek to engender the formationof
cultural norms or to frame personal ethical decisions as a means of
conditioning behavior.
We now turn to the question of whether culture and/or ethics can help
fill the gap inevitably left by law and markets, and whether regulation can be
used to enhance the formation and effectiveness of these behavioral
constraints."
III. THE ROLE AND LIMITS OF CULTURE AND ETHICS INFINANCE

A. Making Sense of Culture andEthics
We are sympathetic to the view reflected in Andrew Hill's
statement-"when I hear the words corporate culture, I reach for my
pistol""-that culture is an inherently slippery concept. Ethics, if anything,
is even more elusive. Framing policy debates around seemingly inchoate
concepts like culture and ethics is thus often, and understandably, viewed as
somewhat impractical." Nevertheless, we also know that culture and ethics
are important determinants of human and organizational behavior. As a
starting point, some degree of definitional precision is thus required. What
do we mean in the present context by "culture" and "ethics"? And,
importantly, on what basis should we distinguish between these two
seemingly intertwined (and yet often muddled) concepts?
Robert Ellickson provides us with a useful framework for thinking
about these questions." Ellickson draws a distinction between first, second,
and third-party behavioral constraints. 4 First-party constraints are imposed

'oPaul A. Volcker, former chairman of the Federal Reserve and the Economic Recovery
Advisory Board, recognized the importance of organizational culture in filling this gap inproposing
his "Volcker Rule." See Letter from Paul A. Volcker to U.S. Dep't of Treasury, Fed. Reserve Bd.,
Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Secs. & Exch. Comm'n, Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n (Feb. 13,
2012), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/SECRS/2012/February/20120216/R-1432/R1432 021312 105358329618485095_1.pdf.
7
'Andrew Hill, Culture Questionsfor Goldman's Blankfein, FIN.TIMES BLOG (Mar. 14,
2012, 1:05 PM), http://www.ft.com (search title).
72
See Sebastian Mallaby, Woodrow Wilson Knew How to BeardBehemoths, FIN. TIMES
(London), July 6, 2012, http://www.ft.com (search title) (observing that "[wihen policy debates are
dominated by the c-word, you know we are out of practical ideas").
13See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WrrHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETrLE DisPuTEs
123 (1991).
74
1d. at 126-27 (employing "controllers" terminology to describe these constraints).
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7
by an actor on him or herself. This is the domain of "personalethics."
Second-party constraints are those which flow from systems of reward and
punishment within the context of bilateral relationships between promisors
6 Third-party
and promisees. This, in turn, is the domain of "contract.""
constraints, meanwhile, are imposed and administered by actors (i.e.,
organizations and governments) or social forces (i.e., norms) which, in a
strictly technical sense, reside outside the perimeter of such contractual
relationships." Culture-understood as the body of non-legal norms,
conventions, or expectations shared by actors when operating in social or
institutional settings-can thus be viewed as one subspecies of third-party
behavioral constraints.n
Culture, ethics, and the law can thus all be viewed as
mechanisms-empty vessels-through which various substantive norms are
generated, monitored, and enforced. The substantive content of cultural
norms and ethics (or, indeed, the law") may be identical. The prohibition
against the taking of human life, for example, exists across all three
dimensions. But equally, cultural, ethical, and legal norms may come into
conflict with one another. The key distinction for our purposes is the source
of the behavioral constraint and, ultimately, the impact this has on its
potential efficacy. In the case of culture and the law, the constraint is an
external or exogenous one. In the case of personal ethics, by contrast, it is
internal, or endogenous."

"sId.at 126.
76

Id.

nSee ELLICKSON, supra note 73, at 127. Although even this distinction is incomplete
insofar as membership in many organizations is often contractual in nature.
78
We deviate from Ellickson's framework slightly in that we henceforth include constraints
generated by private (i.e., non-state) organizations as falling into the category of "norms," whereas
Ellickson categorizes them as "organizational rules". See id. This change is merely to facilitate
exposition and not to deny the importance of broader questions surrounding what institutions should
or should not be understood as sources of the law. Moreover, this approach is consistent with that
employed in the economic literature exploring the generation, monitoring, and enforcement of norms
by groups of private actors. See infra Part IV.C. Note also that this distinction between first party
and third party constraints has an affinity with sociological and legal sociological approaches that
posit the radical separation between individual norms and rules and collective or systemic rules and
constraints. See, e.g., EMILE DURKHEIM, THE RULEs OF SOCIOLOGICAL METHOD 110-12
(Steven Lukes ed., W.D. Halls trans. 1982) (distinguishing between individual and collective
representations); NIKLAS LUHMANN, ESSAYS ON SELF REFERENCE 24 (1990) (distinguishing
between psychic and communicative systems); Gunther Teubner, How the Law Thinks: Towarda
ConstructivistEpistemology of the Law, 23 L. & Soc'Y REv. 727, 732 (1989) (distinguishing
between "psychic intentions" and "social communication").
79
Although, as we have seen, the law can be an inflexible tool for articulating this content.
See supra Part I.B.
8
"Ultimately, of course, it is difficult to unpack which factors are either exogenous or
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This, of course, raises an important set of questions: to what extent
can cultural norms (or the law) be understood as simply reflecting "shared
ethics"? Conversely, what impact do external behavioral constraints, such as
cultural norms or the law, have on our internal ethical perspective? Put
differently: to what extent do law and culture mold our ethical identity? In
the discussion that follows, we largely bracket these questions and use the
term "ethical culture" where possible, to signify that culture and ethics can
be employed as symbiotic, mutually re-enforcing constraints. Before we
articulate the substantive content of this "other regarding" ethical culture,
however, it is useful to first canvas the role and limits of both ethics and
culture as potential drivers of human and organizational behavior.
B. The Role and Limits ofEthics
The source of ethical constraints is endogenous to each individual
actor: part of that individual's identity. Ultimately, it is this internal
orientation-along with the inherent subjectivity and unobservability of
first-party enforcement-which renders the behavioral impact of ethics
difficult to model in theory and measure in the real world.' For some, ethics
may provide a powerful guide for personal and professional conduct. For
others, it may be dominated by other competing influences. For others still,
it may, like Oliver Wendell Holmes' "bad man,"" not play the slightest role.
Moreover, even within these (somewhat artificial") categories there exist
substantial problems of inter-personal and inter-temporal comparison. This,
in turn, makes it difficult to identify "shared ethics". It also raises the
prospect that, even at the individual level, ethical perspectives may vary over
time and across contexts.84
endogenous when attempting to identify the determinants of behavior. Moreover, while something
like culture might be exogenous to an individual, it can be seen as endogenous to the organization or
group of which that individual is a member.
8
'Although this is precisely what the field of neuro-ethics attempts to do. See generally
EDWARD 0. WILSON, THE SOCIAL CONQUEST OF EARTH (2012) (espousing theories of
evolutionary ethics).
82
Mr. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Justice, Supreme Judicial Court of Mass., Address at the
Dedication of the New Hall of the Boston University School of Law: The Path of the Law (Jan. 8,
1897), reprintedin Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Pathofthe Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 45961 (1897) (stating that "a [bad] man who cares nothing for an ethical rule which is believed and
practised by his neighbors is likely nevertheless to care a good deal to avoid being made to pay
money, and will want to keep out ofjail if he can").
83
Both in the sense that (1) the influence of ethics on the behavior of individual actors is
perhaps best measured along a spectrum and (2) we might expect actors to fall into different groups
at different times and in different contexts.
"See MICHAEL J.SANDEL, WHAT MONEY CAN'T BUY: THE MORAL LIMrrS OF MARKETS 6
(2012) (providing a contemporary discussion about markets).
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The internal nature of ethics also raises a problem for regulation:
namely, how can it influence internal ethical perspectives and decisionmaking? Here, ongoing work in the fields of cognitive and social
psychology offer some potentially valuable insights. First, the moral
intensity (or salience) of an ethical problem can be an important
determinant of ethical decision-making." As Thomas Jones explains, the
moral intensity of a problem is a function of, interalia:(1) the magnitude of
the potential consequences; (2) the probability that consequences will occur;
(3) their concentration; (4) temporal immediacy; (5) social consensus and;
importantly (6) proximity." Proximity is a measure of the physical,
psychological, social, or cultural distance between a decision-maker and
those whom their decisions affect." For example, the anonymity
within large, complex organizations, technologies enabling "faceless"
communication across great distances, and the commoditization of business
transactions and relationships might all be expected to decrease moral
intensity." The potential upshot, however, is that by reconfiguring financial
institutions and markets with a view to reducing physical or psychological
distance, it may be possible to enhance ethical decision-making."
Importantly, the factors identified by Jones as contributing to moral
intensity are characteristics of the ethical problem itself, not of decisionmakers." This, in turn, introduces the prospect that we might be able to
reframe elements of the problem so as to highlight their ethical dimensions.
The trolley (or footbridge) problem is a paradigmatic example. In the classic
formulation of this problem, individuals are asked to participate in a thought
experiment in which a train is speeding toward five people tied to the
tracks." Participants are then told that, by pulling a switch, they can redirect

"See Thomas M. Jones, Ethical Decision Making by Individuals in Organizations:An
Issue-ContingentModel, 16 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 366, 372-74 (1991). Consistent with the relevant
cognitive science literature, the terms "moral" and "ethical" (and their various derivations) are used
interchangeably in this section.
6
Id. at 374-78
87
1d. at 376. Linked to moral intensity is the concept of normative focus: the notion that
social or personal norms will only influence behavior if salient at the time ofdecision-making. See
Carl A. Kallgren et al., A Focus Theory ofNormative Conduct: When Norms Do andDo Not Affect
Behavior, 26 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1002, 1006 (2000).
88
See Jones, supra note 85, at 376 ("Intuitively, people care more about other people who
are close to them (socially, culturally, psychologically, or physically) than they do for people who are
distant.").
"See id. at 376, 387-88; Stanley Milgram, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY: AN
EXPERIMENTAL ViEW 33-34 (1974).
90

Jones, supra note 85, at 371.

"See JUDITH JARVIS THOMSON, RIGHTS, RESTITUTION, AND RISK: ESSAYS IN MORAL

THEORY 94-116 (William Parent ed., 1986); Philippa Foot, The Problem of Abortion and the
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the train onto a second track to which a single person is tied.' In both cases,
the person(s) tied to the tracks in the path of the train are certain to perish. 3
Participants are then asked to consider a second hypothetical in which they
are told that the runaway train can be stopped by pushing a man from a
footbridge onto the tracks.94 Notably, while the welfare implications are
identical in each case, experimental evidence suggests that participants (1)
experience a stronger emotional response to the second hypothetical and (2)
are far less likely to push the man in front of the train than they are to pull
the switch." The implication, in the view of many, is that by forcing people
to directly confront the ethical dimensions of their decisions, it may be
possible to make ethics a more powerful influence on behavior.
The second important insight is that contemplation or reflection can
enhance ethical decision-making." Cognitive scientists distinguish between
two types of cognitive processes: intuitive processes, in which judgments are
made rapidly and automatically (System 1), and controlled processes, in
which judgments are slower and more deliberate (System 2)." Several
Doctrineofthe DoubleEffect, 5 OXFORD REv. 1, 2 (1967), reprintedin PHILIPPA FOOT, VIRTUES
AND VICES AND OTHER ESSAYS INMORAL PHILOSOPHY 23 (1978).
92
See THOMSON, supranote 91, at 94.
93
See id
94
See id at 82.
95
See Piercarlo Valdesolo & David DeSteno, Manipulations ofEmotionalContext Shape
Moral Judgment, 17 PSYCHOL. ScI. 476, 476 (2006); Joshua D. Greene et al., An fMRI
Investigation ofEmotionalEngagement in MoralJudgment, 293 SC. 2105,2106 (2001); Natalie
Gold et al., FramingEffects in Ethical Dilemmas: Research Project in Experimental Philosophy

(Experimental Ethics) (Arts & Humanities Research Council Workshop May 3-4, 2012),
http://www.le.ac.uk/psychology/amc/ahrc.html (last visited Sept. 26, 2012); see also RICHARD H.
THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND
HAPPINESS 19, 54-55 (2008) (discussing framing effects more generally).
96
See Lawrence Kohlberg, Stage andSequence: The Cognitive-DevelopmentalApproachto
Socialization, in HANDBOOK OF SOCIALIZATION THEORY AND RESEARCH 347 (David A. Goslin
ed., 1969); J. Keith Murnighan et al., Bounded PersonalEthics and the Tap Dance of the Real
Estate Agency, in ADVANCES INQUALITATIVE ORGANIZATONAL RESEARCH 23 (2001); Brian
Gunia et al., Contemplation and Conversation:Subtle Influences on Moral Decision Making, 55
ACAD. MGMT. J. 13, 13 (2012). Others, meanwhile, suggest that reflection and reasoning simply
serve to generate ex post rationalizations of ex ante moral intuitions. See Jonathan Haidt, The
Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social IntuitionistApproach to Moral Judgment, 108
PSYCHOL. REV. 814, 814 (2001). Haidt's social intuitionist model, however, is grounded in rightwrong decisions designed to evoke disgust (i.e., incest) on the part of test subjects. See id at 817.
We submit that the vast majority of ethical decisions within the business context do not evoke
similar emotions.
97
See Daniel Kahneman & Shane Frederick, Representativeness Revisited: Attribute
Substitution in IntuitiveJudgment, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE
JUDGMENT 51 (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2002); Seymour Epstein, Integrationofthe Cognitive
and Psychodynamic Unconscious, 49 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 709, 710 (1994); Shane Frederick,
Cognitive Reflection andDecision Making, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 25, 26 (2005); Keith E. Stanovich &
Richard F. West, IndividualDifferences in Reasoning: Implicationsfor the RationalityDebate?, 23
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scholars have proposed that utilitarian or consequentialist moral judgments
take place within System 2." This view finds empirical support in a recent
study by Gunia, Wang, Huang, Wang, and Murnighan, in which test subjects
were given three minutes to consider a right-wrong decision-i.e., whether
to tell the truth or lie for personal gain-and instructed to "think very
carefully" before making their decision." The authors of the study found
that subjects in this contemplation condition were five times more likely to
tell the truth than subjects asked to make an immediate decision.' In the
view of some scholars, this apparent link between intuitive processes and
self-interested decisions reflects deeply engrained evolutionary motives.'o
Moreover, these motives may dominate in environments such as finance
where a premium is placed on quick thinking and decisiveness. 2
Contemplation, in contrast, allows individuals to consciously weigh ethical
considerations against self-interest."' As a result, slowing decision-making
processes down and reflecting on their ethical dimensions may yield socially
desirable behavioral effects.
Finally, morally-oriented conversations can promote more ethical
decision-making in the context of right-wrong decisions pitting values such
as honesty against self-interest.'" Gunia et al., for example, found that test
subjects having even a brief, anonymous, and electronic morally-oriented
conversation were four times more likely to tell the truth than subjects
having a self-interested conversation."' In effect, conversation can be
utilized to highlight the ethical dimensions of problems, enhance moral
intensity (or normative focus) and, thereby, put ethical considerations on
firmer footing within group decision-making processes."' Simultaneously,
BEHAV. & BRAIN ScI. 645,658 (2000); Daniel Kahneman, Nobel Prize Lecture, Maps ofBounded
Rationality: A Perspective on Intuitive Judgment and Choice (Dec. 8, 2002), available at

http://www.nobelprize.org/nobeljprizes/economics/laureates/2002/kahnemann-lecture.pdf.
9

8See Joshua D. Greene, Why are VMPFC Patients More Utilitarian?:A Dual-Process
Theory ofMoral JudgmentExplains, 11 TRENDS INCOGNITIVE SCI. 322, 322 (2007); Joshua D.
Greene et al., The NeuralBases ofCognitive Conflict and Controlin MoralJudgment,44 NEURON

389, 391 (2004); Greene et al., supra note 95, at 2107.
99
Gunia et al., supra note 96, at 19-20.
'0See id. at 22; see also Joseph M. Paxton et al., Reflection and Reasoning in Moral

Judgment, 36 COGNITIVE SCI. 163, 171 (2012) (documenting an increased utilitarian moral
judgment after inducing people to be more reflective).
01
See Murnighan et al., supra note 96, at 20-22.
102See Gunia et al., supra note 96, at 27.
'0oSee id. at 15-16.
04See id. at 17-18.
'osSee id. at 24.
6

See AMITAI ETzIONi, THE MORAL DiMENSION: TOWARD A NEw ECONOMICS 42
(1988). This, of course, works in both directions: conversations which emphasize self-interest may
have the opposite effect. See Rebecca K. Ratner & Dale T. Miller, The Norm ofSelf-InterestandIts
Effects on SocialAction, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 5, 5 (2001).
10
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however, these conversations must be about more than simply allowing
individuals and groups to construct ex post explanations which reinforce
their ex ante intuitions.0 7
Ultimately, of course, the insights of cognitive and social psychology
must be approached with caution as potential drivers of public policy.'o
Many strands of this research are still in their theoretical and experimental
infancy. Moreover, most of the relevant empirical work has been confined
to the laboratory; the real world may confound these predictions.
Organizational and other environmental factors may similarly interfere with
strategies designed to enhance ethical decision-making."' Nevertheless, as
we explore further below, this research may help us better understand ways
in which regulation can counteract the emergence of "bad apples" and "bad
barrels" within organizations."'
C. The Role and Limits of Culture in Finance
Few would argue that cultural, commercial, and other extra-legal
norms are not capable of exerting a profound influence on human and
organizational behavior. Moreover, such norms theoretically offer a number
of potential advantages vis-a-vis other behavioral constraints-e.g., the
law-in terms of, inter alia, their responsiveness, adaptability, and the
relatively low costs of monitoring and enforcement. In markets, these norms
can also help overcome the adverse selection and coordination problems
which inhibit the development of efficient markets."' Perhaps not
surprisingly, therefore, a significant body of scholarship has emerged,
dedicated to exploring the precise circumstances in which privately
generated norms arise and when they can be expected to yield Pareto
improvements over both law and markets."' The majority ofthis scholarship

07

See Gunia et al., supra note 96, at 18-19; Haidt, supra note 96, at 822.
'08See Ben Seymour & Ivo Vlaev, Can, and Should, Behavioural NeuroscienceInfluence
Public Policy?, 16 TRENDS INCOGNITIVE Scl. 449, 551 (2012).
09
See Kallgren et al., supra note 87, at 1011 ("A variety of situational factors may draw
attention to a relevant norm or distract attention from it.").
"0Neal M. Ashkanasy et. al., Bad Apples in Bad Barrels Revisited: Cognitive Moral
Development, Just WorldBeliefs, Rewards, andEthicalDecision-Making,16 Bus. ETHICS Q.449,
451 (2006) ("The 'bad apples' perspective suggests that individual differences affect ethical
decision-making and behavior.").
"'See, e.g., Dan Awrey, The Dynamics of OTC Derivatives Regulation: Bridging the
Public-PrivateDivide, II EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 155, 163-64 (2010) (describing how the
contractual norms developed by the International Swaps and Derivatives Association helped
overcome coordination problems inhibiting the development of OTC derivatives markets).
"'See Stephen E. Ellis & Grant M. Hayden, The Cult ofEfficiency in CorporateLaw, 5 VA.
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has centered around homogeneous and geographically proximate groups of
market actors-for example, ranchers,"' diamond merchants," 4 and cotton
merchants"'--engaged in long-term, repeat play interactions. Broadly
speaking, this scholarship supports the intuition that the most successful
norms-i.e., those generating binding behavioral constraints-will be those
where: (1) violations are easily observable, (2) news of violations is easily
disseminated within the relevant group, and (3) the group possesses both the
capacity and incentives to impose immediate and meaningful sanctions on
violators."' These factors provide a framework for thinking about the
formation of cultural norms not only in the context of market interactions,
but also within individual firms.
The financial services industry has produced numerous "codes of
conduct," "codes of ethics," and "principles of best practice" which purport
to articulate various norms. Prominent examples include the Chartered
Financial Analyst (the "CFA") Institute's Code ofEthics andStandards of
Professional Conduct,"' the Chartered Institute for Securities and
Investment's Code of Conduct,"' and the Alternative Investment
Management Association Guides to Sound Practices."' The salient
L. & BUS. REv. 239, 241-245 (2010) (explaining the Pareto principal and its relation to corporate
governance).
"3See ELLICKSON, supra note 73, at 1.
"4See Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out ofthe Legal System: ExtralegalContractualRelations in
the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115, 115 (1992).

"5See Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating
Cooperation ThroughRules, Norms, andInstitutions,99 MICH. L. REv. 1724, 1725-28 (2001).
"6 See Bernstein, supra note 114, at 124-30 (discussing the New York Diamond Club's
private arbitration system and how it resolves disputes on the basis of trade customs and usages);
Bernstein, supra note 115, at 1726-28, 1737-38 (discussing how merchants comply with arbitration
decisions of cotton trade associations because failing to do so results in a widely publicized
expulsion which affects the profitability of a merchants business and his reputation); Avner Greif,
Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: The Maghribi Traders'
Coalition, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 525, 525-26, 528-29, 535, 544 (1993) (discussing how the

Maghribi's information-transmission mechanism enabled merchants to monitor agents and make
cheating known to all, which prevented the agents from acting opportunistically and embezzling
trader's goods); ELLICKSON, supra note 73, at 1 (discussing how neighbors in a rural county in
California "resolve a variety of disputes that arise from wayward cattle"). In viewing diffusion
mechanisms as key to the enforcement of norms, we adopt an individualist rather than an
institutionalist approach to norm formation. See Michael Hechter & Elizabeth Borland, National
Self Determination:The Emergence of an InternationalNorm, in SOCIAL NORMS 186 (Michael
Hechter & Karl-Dieter Opp eds., 2001).
"'Code of Ethics and Standards of ProfessionalConduct, CHARTERED FIN. ANALYSIS
INST. [Code ofEthics], http://www.cfainstitute.org/ethics/codes/ethics/Pages/index.aspx (last visited
Sept. 27, 2012).

"sCode ofConduct, CHARTERED INST. FOR SECS. & INVS., http://www.siservices.co.uk/
brochures/imgpdflCode%20of/o2OConduct/o20201 1a5%20without.pdf (last visited Sept. 27,
2012).
" 9 Guides to SoundPractices,ALT. INV. MGMTASSN, http://www.aima.orglen/knowledge
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question, however, is whether these norms generate meaningful behavioral
constraints across the financial services industry.'20 Ultimately, this is an
important empirical question which resides beyond the scope of this paper.
Nevertheless, there exist a number of reasons to suggest that, in a great many
cases, the real world impact of these norms may be very limited.
First, as we have already observed, the complexity of modem
financial markets is often the source of acute asymmetries of information
and expertise.12 ' These asymmetries undermine the ability of market
participants with lower tolerances for this complexity to detect violations of
any relevant norms, either by their own counterparties, or in the marketplace
more generally.'22 This is especially problematic given that it is precisely
these market participants which are, almost by definition, most at risk. In
June 2012, for example, the U.K.'s Financial Services Authority
("FSA")-the predecessor to the new Financial Conduct Authority
("FCA")- completed a review which found evidence of widespread misselling of complex interest rate hedging products to relatively
unsophisticated small and medium sized enterprises.'23 Previous FSA
reviews have also uncovered extensive mis-selling of, inter alia, payment
protection insurance'24 and sub-prime mortgage products.'25 The U.S. has
similarly experienced a spate of mis-selling claims in the wake of the GFC.'26
Importantly, this behavior emerged and persisted despite the existence of
centre/sound-practices/guides-to-sound-practices.cfm (last visited Sept. 27, 2012).
120See supra

notes 46-47 and accompanying
text.

121See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
122See

Awrey, supra note 111, 175-77.

123See Press Release, FSA, FSA Update, Interest Rate Hedging Products: Information About

Our Work and Findings (June 2012), availableat http://www.fsa.gov.uk/static/pubs/other/interestrate-hedging-products.pdf. The regulatory structure of banks and financial services in the U.K. has
recently been reformed. As of April 1,2013, the existing functions of the FSA in relation to market
conduct have been transferred to a new Financial Conduct Authority. See Regulatory Reform Background, FSA, http://www.fsa.gov.uk/about/what/reg reform/background. Its current
prudential regulation function, meanwhile, has been transferred to a new Prudential Regulatory
Authority ("PRA"), a subsidiary of the Bank of England. See id.
124See Press Release, FSA, The Sale of Payment Protection Insurance: Results of Thematic
Work (Nov. 2005), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other /ppi thematic report.pdf;
Payment ProtectionInsuranceMarket InvestigationOrder2011, COMPETITION COMM'N (Mar. 24,

2011), available at http://www.competition-commission.org.uk/ (search title). As of April 2013,
£9.3 billion has been paid out in refunds and compensation for mis-sold payment protection
insurance. See Monthly PPIRefunds and Compensation,FCA, http://www.fea.org.uk/consumers/

fmancial-services-products/insurance/payment-protection-insurance/refunds (last visited April. 25,
2013).
25
1 See Press Release, FSA, FSA Finds Poor Practices by Intermediaries and Lenders within
Sub-prime Market (July 4, 2007), availableat http://www.fsa.gov.uk/library/communication/
pr/2007/081.shtml.
126See Tom Braithwaite et al., Banks Sued Over Mortgage Deals, FIN. TIMES (London),
Sept. 3, 2011, availableat http://www.ft.com (search title).
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numerous industry codes and institutional pronouncements stating, in effect,
that the customer always comes first."' It did so, at least in part, because the
market participants which it targeted were poorly positioned to detect it.
Second, even where violations are observable, there is often no
credible threat of enforcement. The CFA Institute's Code ofEthics provides
an illustrative example.'28 The CFA is arguably the most prestigious
designation for financial services professionals. The Code of Ethics
stipulates that CFA members must act with integrity, diligence, competence,
respect and in an ethical manner.'" In the context of advisory relationships,
it also imposes duties of loyalty, fair dealing, suitability, and disclosure of
conflicts of interest.3 o These important ethical objectives have much in
common with those articulated in other professional contexts such as law
and accountancy."' The CFA Institute has established a disciplinary
procedure to address violations of the Code ofEthics,with its most powerful
sanctions being to suspend or revoke a violator's membership.'32
As an organization whose reputation and financial resources are
derived from its ability to attract and retain its members, however, the CFA
Institute's incentives to vigorously pursue enforcement action are relatively
weak."' This weakness is reflected in the CFA Institute's own enforcement
statistics, which report an average of 2.42 suspensions and 0.92 expulsions
per year from 2000-2011 from a total membership of over 98,000.14 This

127See, e.g., Business Principles and Standards: Golden Sachs Business Principles,

GOLDMAN SACHS, http://www.goldmansachs.com/who-we-are/business-standards/business-princi
ples/index.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2013) (stating "[o]ur clients' interests always come first.").
128See generally Disciplinary Statistics, CFA

INST.

(2000-12),

available at

www.cfainstitute.org/ethics/Documents/Professional%20Conduct/ 2OProgram%2ODocuments/me
m_discipline stats.pdf (illustrating examples and giving guidance on the Standards of day-to-day
professional activities).
29
1 Code ofEthics andStandardsofProfessional Conduct, CFA, www.cfapubs.org/doil
pdf/10.2469/ccb.v2010.n14.1 (last visited Feb. 24, 2013).
30

See id.
"'See, e.g., SolicitorsRegulatory Authority Handbook, SOLICITORS REG. AUTH. (Oct. 6,
2011), http://www.sra.org.uk/handbook/ (legal standards); Ethical Standardsfor Auditors, FIN.
REPORTING COUNCIL, http://www.frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Codes-Standards/Audit-and-assurance/

Standards-and-guidance/Standards-and-guidance-for-auditors/Ethical-standards-for-auditors.aspx
(last visited Feb. 24, 2013) (accounting standards).
2
1 See CurrentIndustry-RelatedSanctions, CFA INST., availableat www.cfainstitute.org/
ethics/conduct/pages/current industry_relatedsanctions.aspx (last visited Feb. 24, 2013). It can
also issue, inter alia, cautionary letters, private reprimands and public censures. Id.
"3See generallyDisciplinaryStatistics, CFA INST., availableat www.cfainstitute.org/et
hics/Documents/Professional%20Conduct%20Program%2ODocuments/mem discipline-stats.pdf
(last visited Feb. 24, 2013) (presenting the lack of enforcement in the statistics of professional
conduct cases involving industry matters from 2000-2012).
134See id. The figures over the same period for cautionary letters, private reprimands and
censures are, respectively, 16.25, 5.83 and 1.17 per year. See id.
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data suggests either that CFA members almost never violate the Code of
Ethics or, perhaps more likely, that the probability of detection and
subsequent enforcement is extremely low.
Theoretically, the violation of norms can also be enforced within the
marketplace itself via the imposition of reputational sanctions."' Once
again, however, high information costs can be expected to impede the
process by which news ofviolations is disseminated within the marketplace
and, thus, undermine the potency of this market-based enforcement
mechanism."' Indeed, even where information costs are relatively low, the
mobility (and resulting transience) of personnel within the financial services
industry can make it difficult to effectively target reputational sanctions."'
Concomitantly, it is not uncommon for market participants to make
significant relationship-specific investments in the financial services firms
with which they do business."' This, in turn, increases the costs of "exit" in
response to the violation of a norm recognized as existing within the context
of that relationship and, as a corollary, increases the likelihood ofprivaterenegotiation or alternative dispute resolution (as opposed to public litigation)
as a means of compensating the aggrieved party for any loss."' Each of
these factors is likely to have a dilutive impact on any market discipline
which might have otherwise been brought to bear on those market
participants perceived to have violated a cultural or commercial norm.

While markets may not provide the most fertile ground for the
formation and cultivation of cultural norms, the structure of the firm
arguably holds considerably more promise. The frequency of interactions
within a firm will often render violations of firm-specific norms (relatively)

'.See Cindy R. Alexander, On the Nature of the ReputationalPenaltyfor Corporate

Crime, 42 J. L. & EcON. 489, 490-91 (1999); John Armour et al4 Regulatory Sanctions and
ReputationalDamage in FinancialMarkets I (Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper No. 62/2010,
2012), availableathttp://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1678028; John R. Graham
et al., CorporateMisreportingand Bank loan Contracting,89 J.FIN. ECON. 44, 46 (2008); Gregg
Jarrell & Sam Peltzman, The Impact ofProductRecalls on the Wealth ofSellers, 93 J. POL. ECON.
512, 513 (1985); Jonathan M. Karpoff et al., The Costto Firms of Cooking the Books, 43 J. FIN. &
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 581, 583 (2008); Benjamin Klein & Keith Laffler, The Role ofMarket
Forces in Ensuring ContractualPerformance, 89 J. POL. ECON. 615,616 (1981).

'"John Armour et al., supra note 135, at 11.
'See id. How, for example, do you impose effective reputational sanctions in the
circumstance where the violation was committed by a team at financial institution "A", but where all
members of the team are now dispersed among institutions "B," "C," and "D"? And what if the
senior management team at "A" at the time of the violation - who might have notionally been
responsible for overseeing the team's activities - have themselves moved on? Where, in this case, is
the appropriate locus of the sanction?
'"Klein & Keith, supra note 135, at 616.
'"Alexander, supra note 135, at 516-17.
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observable.'40 Violations of these norms can then be disseminated easily up
the firm's hierarchy through formal complaint and compliance procedures,
management information systems, as well as by word of mouth. There also
exists a range of firm-level disciplinary mechanisms which provide relatively
low cost means of sanctioning non-compliance. These mechanisms include,
inter alia: dismissal, demotion, promotion (or the denial thereof), quality of
work flow, and, of course, remuneration.
The key question for financial services firms is thus not how to
generate, monitor, and enforce compliance with cultural norms per se but,
rather, how to foster a more ethical culture. While codes of ethics can be
drafted and held up as reflective of best practice, the cultural norms these
codes purport to reflect may be overpowered by other countervailing cultural
norms.
Indeed, there is significant anecdotal evidence of such
countervailing norms within many financial firms. These norms resemble
what Dale Miller has characterized as "the norm of self-interest;"'"" a norm
reinforced by existing incentive structures.'42 Notably, "self-interest" in this
context may encompass the interests of individual employees, teams,
divisions,'43 or even the entire institution.'44 Indeed, a prominent diagnosis of
recent events-including the Libor, mis-selling, and money-laundering
scandals-has been that dysfunctional firm cultures were the primary driver
of these failings.1'

'0Although, especially within financial services firms, there may be ample scope for agents
to hide their non-compliant behavior. This reality is driven home by the "rogue trader" scandals
such as Nick Leeson's trading activities at Barings plc.
'4 1Ratner & Miller, supranote 106, at 5.

142See Salz Review: An Independent Review of Barclay'sBusiness Practices(2013) at 6

(observing that "[w]e believe that the business practices for which Barclays has rightly been
criticised were shaped predominantly by its cultures"), availableathttp://group.barclays.com/aboutbarclays/citizenship/salz-review-report. See also Grant Woods, BarclaysCulture DiscouragedStaff
from RaisingConcerns, FIN. TIMES (London), July 10, 2012, availableat http://www.ft.com (search

title) for anecdotal evidence supporting the view that a culture of individualism is readily enforced
within financial services firms. See also id ("The culture at Barclays in 2006-07, when I worked
there, discouraged staff from raising concerns; in some instances, their loyalty and commitment were
questioned, should they do so. There was also the unsaid threat that it could adversely affect any
potential bonus or, worse, undermine their job security.").
14'See Gillian Tett, Insight: AnthropologicalInsights into BankingBehaviour, FIN. TIMES

(London), Jan. 17, 2008, at I (referring to "warring . .. tribal cultures" in Citibank and Merrill
Lynch).
'"See id.
' 4 sSee Shaming the Banks into Better Ways: Barclays Affair Shines Unsparing Light on

FinancialSector, FIN. TIMES (London), June 28, 2012, at 8 (referring to the "rotten culture at
Barclays").
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D. Toward a More Ethical Culture in Finance
So what is the substantive content of the ethical culture this paper
aspires to cultivate? As stated at the outset, our dual objectives are to
explore ways in which the law and markets might be utilized to engender
cultural and ethical constraints on both (1) opportunism in the context of
bilateral counterparty arrangements and (2) socially excessive risk-taking.146
The common theme underlying both of these objectives is the desire to
promote what can best be characterized as a norm of "other regarding"
behavior within financial services firms, one which, to the fullest extent
possible, attempts to induce firms to take into account the private and social
costs of their decisions.147 These objectives should not, in our view, be
controversial given the enormous social impact of the GFC and the
questionable conduct and practices which it has brought to light. Moreover,
as described above (and in further detail below) "other regarding" norms are
already reflected in many of the codes of conduct, principles of best practice,
and other guidance produced by various professional bodies and other
organizations. Our objective in this article is to explore whether it might be
possible to enhance the behavioral impact of these norms.
IV. WHO ISMY CLIENT? CARVING OUT A ROLE FOR A MORE
ETHIcAL CULTURE IN BILATERAL COUNTERPARTY
RELATIONSHIPS

Financial policymakers are well aware of the important role culture
can play within financial services firms. The Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision, for example, has observed that "[a] demonstrated corporate
culture that supports and provides appropriate norms and incentives for
professional and responsible behavior is an essential foundation of good
goveriance.""4 Many senior figures within the financial services industry
have, similarly, signaled that they are receptive to the idea that culture can

46

1 See supra Part R.B.

' 4 7 1t is noteworthy in this regard that "other regardingness" is the touchstone used in much
of the cognitive science literature as a proxy for "ethical" decision-making and conduct. See Gunia
et al., supra note 96, at 14.
14

8PrinciplesforEnhancingCorporateGovernance, BCBS, 8,22 (Oct. 4,2010), available

at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsl76.pdf ("Sound corporate governance is evidenced, among other
things, by a culture where senior management and staff are expected and encouraged to identify risk
issues as opposed to relying on the internal audit or risk management functions to identify them.
This expectation is conveyed not only through bank policies and procedures, but also through the
'tone at the top' established by the board and senior management.").
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play a meaningful role in firm governance. 149 From the perspective of many
policymakers, however, the objective of fostering meaningful cultural and or
ethical constraints on socially undesirable behavior is, at best, aspirational.'Io
As a result, while we have seen post-crisis calls for financial services firms
to take culture and ethics more seriously, we have not seen substantive
policy proposals which would seek to actively promote a more ethical culture
in finance.
A. The TCF Initiative
Nevertheless, there are precedents. One such precedent is an
ostensibly modest scheme implemented by the U.K.'s FSA prior to the crisis,
known as the Treating Customers Fairly (the "TCF") Initiative."' As its
name implies, the objective of the TCF Initiative is to compel financial
services firms to treat retail clients fairly.' The first incarnation of the TCF
Initiative was introduced in 2001 in response to a raft of mis-selling claims
involving various financial products.'" Notably, however, the legal
obligation on U.K. financial services firms to treat customers fairly predates
the TCF Initiative.'54 The E.U. Markets in Financial Instruments Directive
("MiFID"), for example, mandates that member States require a financial
services firm to "act honestly, fairly and professionally in accordance with
the best interest of its clients. . . ."I" These requirements are reflected in the

149See, e.g., STEPHEN GREEN, GOOD VALUE: REFLECTIONS ON MONEY, MORALITY AND

AN UNCERTAIN WORLD 198 (2009) (observing that "[e]veryone knows about the importance of trust
and honesty for a sustainable business").
50
See, e.g., Davies, supra note 12 (emphasizing that "it is not for regulators to devise a fullscale ethical code for financial firms"); City's EthicsAwareness Lessons Must PercolateDown, FIN.

TIMES (London), October 4, 2010, available at http://www.ft.com (search title) (observing that
Hector Sants, former CEO of the U.K.'s FSA, "was told on arrival at the FSA that the regulator
'does not do ethics"').
"'See Treating Customers Fairly, FSA, http://www.fsa.gov.uk/doing/reg
ulated/tcf (last visited January 16, 2013).
2
15 See id.
53
See Sharon Gilad, Overcoming Resistance to Regulation via Reframing andDelegation,
in REGULATION & GOVERNANCE (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 9), available at
http://law.huji.ac.iVupload/Sharon.Gilad.pdf.
I5 4See Julia Black et al., Making a Success ofPrinciples-basedRegulation, 1 LAW & FIN.

MKT. 191, 191 (2007).
.s.Council Directive 2004/39, art. 19(1), 2004 O.J. (L 145/1) (EC). Notably, recently
proposed amendments to MiFID would clarify that "the overarching high level principle to act
honestly, fairly and professionally and the obligation to be fair, clear and not misleading should
apply irrespective of [retail or professional] client categorization." Explanatory Memorandum on
Proposed Directive on Markets in Financial Instruments repealing Directive 2004/39/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council, s. 3.4.8 (October 20, 2011), available at http://eur-
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FCA's, as well as its predecessor the FSA's, Principles for Business, which
include, interalia,the requirement to act honestly and with integrity, to treat
customers fairly, and to communicate with clients in a way that is fair and
not-misleading.'" What distinguishes the TCF Initiative from these broader
regulatory pronouncements, however, is that firm processes and culture are
the targets of regulation.
The TCF Initiative falls under the umbrella of a diverse collection
of regulatory strategies, which is often described as "processoriented" regulation.'" Process-oriented regulation proceeds from the
acknowledgement that "top-down," prescriptive regulation is often ill-suited
to heterogeneous and fast-paced industries such as finance, where
entrenched asymmetries of information and expertise pervade the
relationship between regulators and regulated actors."' The hallmark of
process-oriented regulation, then, is that it seeks to leverage the superior
information and expertise of regulated actors by granting them the flexibility
to design bespoke organizational processes, systems, and controls with a
view to achieving a set of broad regulatory objectives (or outcomes)
articulated by the regulator.' Simultaneously, however, process-oriented
regulation is about more than leveraging firm-specific information to
produce tailored systems and controls. Process-oriented regulation is also
about incorporating the regulatory objectives (or outcomes) into firm
culture.o As Christine Parker observes, process-oriented regulation, which

lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2011:0656:FIN:en:PDF; Norton Rose, MiFID
Review: Overview, http://www.nortonrose.com/knowledge/publications/57748/mifid-review
overview (last visited Jan. 16, 2013).
56

' FinancialServices Authority Handbook,Principlesfor Business, FSA,

§ 2.1.1

(2001),

availableat http:// fshandbook.info/FS/html/FCA/PRIN.
57
1 See Gilad, supra note 153, at 27. Members of this family include "systems-based
regulation, enforced self-regulation, management-based regulation, principles-based regulation, and
meta-regulation." Sharon Gilad, It Runs in the Family: Meta-regulationandIts Siblings,4 REG. &

GOVERNANCE 485, 485 (2010).
5
1 8See JULIA BLACK, RULES AND REGULATORS 136 (1997); Cass R. Sunstein, Problems
with Rules, 83 CALIF. L. REv. 953, 993-94; Gilad, supra note 157, at 488.
' 59See Christine Parker, Meta-Regulation: Legal Accountability for Corporate Social

Responsibility,in THE NEW CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY: CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY

AND THE LAW 220, 224 (Doreen McBamet et al., eds., 2008).
' 60See TreatingCustomers Fairly- Towards FairOutcomesfor Consumers,FSA, 11 (July

2006), availableat http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/tcf_towards.pdf; see also Julia Black, Forns
and Paradoxes ofPrinciples-BasedRegulation, 3 CAPITAL MKTS. L. J. 425 (2008) (identifying

cultural change as one of the potential advantages of this type of regulation-which she labels
"principles-based" regulation-while simultaneously noting some of the drawbacks of giving
regulatory authority to regulated constituencies that may have incentives to interpret the outcomes in
non-compliant ways); Parker, supra note 159, at 215-16 (stating that the aim for each company
would be to have "an organisational culture that supports and sustains responsibility, and that
management would be carried out in practice in a way that demonstrates responsibility").
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she labels "meta-regulation," focuses "on the inside of corporations to
constitute corporate consciences that go beyond compliance ... ."6

It is important to understand how the TCF Initiative seeks to affect
cultural change. Two ideas appear to underpin this process. The first is
connected to the preconditions to the formation of cultural norms identified
in Part IV: observability, dissemination, and enforcement.162 Of central
importance in this regard is "tone from the top.""'6 More specifically, a key
foundation for cultural change is that senior managers make it clear to the
rest of the firm that (1) the regulatory objectives reflected in the TCF
Initiative matter, and (2) violations will result in internal sanctions.'"
Second, both the act of transferring ownership of regulatory responsibility to
the firm and the firm's engagement with regulatory objectives engender the
formation of norms about expected and legitimate behavior.' 5
In its ideal form, process-oriented regulation promotes dialogue,
processes, systems, and controls that generate behavioral norms that are
articulated, disseminated, monitored, and enforced by internal mechanisms
backed by senior management's imprimatur.'" As Parker and Sharon Gilad
point out, however, it is improbable that firm culture can be instrumentally
created in this way.' Any attempt to foster specified normative positions
takes place through agents (including senior management) that may have
countervailing normative commitments and incentives and who may,
therefore, deploy strategies to resist cultural change.' A more realistic way
to look at process-oriented regulation is thus as one of several complimentary
strategies'" designed to increase the probability that certain normative

16'Id. at 211-12. See also id at 214. ("A corporate conscience is created when values that
transcend narrow self-interest are built into the practice and structure of the enterprise.") (quoting
PHILIP SELZNICK, THE COMMUNITARIAN PERSUASION 101 (2002)).
62
1 See Treating Customers Fairly,supra note 160, at 19-20.
63
1 Seeid at 11.
64
' See Black, supra note 158, at 203.
16sThis view finds support in both organizational and sociological theory. See, e.g., Silbey
et al., "The SociologicalCitizen" RelationalIndependence in Law and Organizations,59 L'ANNtE
SOCIOLOGIQUE 201, 218 (2009) (describing a case study in which project engagement resulted in a
"perceptual and moral transformation"); see also Clifford Geertz, Thick Description:Towardand
Interpretative Theory of Culture, in THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES: SELECTED ESSAYS 17

(1973) (observing that "it is through the flow ofbehaviour-or, more precisely, social action-that
cultural forms find articulation").
'66See Gilad, supra note 157, at 486, 500.
6
1 Christine Parker & Sharon Gilad, Internal CorporateComplianceManagement Systems:
Structure, Culture and Agency, in EXPLAINING

COMPLIANCE: BUSINESS

RESPONSES TO

REGULATION 170, 176-77 (Christine Parker & Vibeke Lehmann Nielson eds., 2011).
68
See id. at 180.
'69 See infra Part V (exploring supportive incentive structures).
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positions can be voiced and gain traction within the firm. Put differently, it
seeks to bias the internal battleground of firm culture in favor of specified
regulatory objectives.
The TCF Initiative proceeds from the identification of six outcomes
which the FSA expects financial services firms to achieve on behalf of their
retail clients.' These outcomes aim to ensure that: (1) fair treatment of
consumers is embedded in corporate culture; (2) products and services meet
the needs of identified consumer groups and are targeted accordingly; (3)
sufficient information is provided to consumers before, during, and after the
point of sale; (4) any advice is suitable to a particular consumer; (5) products
and services meet the expectations of consumers; and (6) consumers do not
face unreasonable post-sale barriers imposed by firms to change product,
switch their provider, submit a claim, or make a complaint."' The FSA has
also produced "extensive guidance" about how firms should approach their
obligations under the TCF Initiative.'72 Compliance with the TCF Initiative
is then measured against the extent to which the processes designed and
implemented by firms are able to deliver against these outcomes."'
Consistent with its process-oriented approach, the TCF Initiative
compels firms to design and evaluate their own organizational processes
against desired regulatory outcomes.'74 In giving firms the flexibility to
design and implement firm-specific processes, the TCF Initiative also shifts
at least some of the responsibility for meaningfully engaging with, and
ultimately achieving, regulatory objectives from the regulator to regulated
firms themselves."' The TCF Initiative places the onus on firms, and
specifically on senior management, to promote an organizational culture that
encourages meaningful internal dialogue about firm practices, their impact
on retail clients, and whether or not they meet the required regulatory
outcomes."' Indeed, the FSA describes the TCF Initiative as "a cultural
issue,""' observing: "[i]t is only through establishing the right culture that

"oSee Treating Customers Fairly - Guide To Management Information, FIN. SERVS.

AuTH., 11 (July 2007), availableat http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/tcfmi.pdf.

"'Id. at
72

11-13.

1 See Gilad,supra note 157, at 14-15; Guide to Management, supra note
73
1 See Treating Customers Fairly,supra note 160, at 5.
74
1

See id. at 9; Gilad, supra note 157, at 11.

170, at 3.

" 5 See Guide to Management,supra note 170, at 1.
' 6See Treating Customers Fairly,supra note 160, at 11.
" Treating Customers Fairly - Culture, FIN. SERVS. AUTH., 2 (July 2007), available at
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/tcf culture.pdf; see also TreatingCustomers Fairly,supra note

160, at 11-12 (referring as well to the goal of effecting a "cultural shift").
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senior management can convert their good intentions into actual fair
outcomes for consumers."' 78
At present, there exists limited empirical evidence against which to
judge the success (or failure) of the TCF Initiative. Recent qualitative
research conducted by Sharon Gilad, however, has examined the TCF
Initiative and, specifically, the pre-conditions to its effective
implementation."' There are two central findings of this important work.
First, external enforcement matters.' Gilad's findings suggest that many
financial services firms were initially reluctant to engage with the TCF
Initiative because, in their view, these firms already treated their customers
fairly."' Indeed, for many firms, engagement involved little more than the
collection of data to demonstrate that fairness was, in fact, taken into
consideration by their employees.'82 As Gilad notes, however, this view
changed, and more meaningful engagement ensued following a marked
increase in the number of enforcement actions stemming from the failure of
individual firms to treat customers fairly.' Importantly, the regulator also
signaled a firm's failure to meaningfully engage with desired regulatory
outcomes-as well as the failure to achieve them-would trigger
enforcement action.'"
The second important finding relates to the role of senior management
in spearheading implementation and ongoing engagement. As described
above, the TCF Initiative does not seek to compel compliance per se.'
Rather, it proceeds on the basis that compliance benefits-i.e., behavioral
change leading to improved outcomes for retail clients-will flow from
dialogue, process design and implementation, and ultimately, cultural
formation."' All of this requires clear signals from senior management that
they support (indeed, demand) engagement with TCF Initiative by all

8
Culture, supra note 177, at 2.
' See Gilad, supra note 157, at 9.

79

'soSee id. at 29.

'81Even when these firms were implicated in various mis-selling claims. See id. at 11-14.
182See id. at 12.
'..See Gilad, supra note 157, at 14-16.
84
1 See Treating Customers Fairly, supra note 160, at 9 ("We will continue to consider
enforcement action in circumstances where a firm's systems or actions leave open the potential for
significant consumer detriment, or where actual significant detriment has occurred. This is much
more likely to be our response where firms continue to deny that TCF has any relevance for them or
have failed to take appropriate steps to work out what changes may be required and to start
implementing them."); see also id. at 46 (stating that the FSA is "more likely to take enforcement
action in cases where a firm has not responded to indications that there are problems, has failed to
identify shortcomings and to develop a strategy to deal with them").
' 85See supra notes 174-78 and accompanying text.
86
1 See Gilad, supra note 157, at 486.
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employees.'" To engage with the TCF Initiative purely through a
compliance lens, and thereby to give a firm's compliance function primary
responsibility for its implementation, would thus undermine its potential
efficacy. Gilad's empirical work confirms this perspective: when firms
viewed the TCF Initiative as the responsibility of compliance professionals,
implementation was measurably slower and less effective.' 8 Notably, then,
Gilad's two findings interact: the threat of external enforcement spurs
management buy-in, and management buy-in internal enforcement and,
ultimately, cultural change.
While empirical data on the impact of the TCF Initiative may be
sparse, there are several reasons for (cautious) optimism. First, the TCF
Initiative articulates a relatively intelligible and non-arbitragable standard of
"other regarding" behavior, thus avoiding two of the principal pitfalls
associated with more prescriptive rules. Second, unlike the various codes of
conduct and ethics produced by the financial services industry, the credible
threat of formal regulatory sanctions in response to failures-not just of
compliancebut, crucially, of engagement-providespowerful motivation for
firms to take the TCF Initiative seriously. Simultaneously, the public
disclosure of sanctions imposed for violations of the TCF Initiative reveals
valuable information to the retail marketplace about a firm's propensity to
treat customers fairly. This could theoretically provide the basis for
enhanced market discipline."' If enforcement action, market discipline, and
managerial leadership are together able to send a clear, unified signal that
engagement will be rewarded-and non-engagement sanctioned-then the
TCF Initiative will have made a meaningful contribution to the promotion of
a more ethical culture within financial services firms.

' 87Indeed, the FSA has itself stressed that commitment on the part of senior management is
crucial to the successful implementation of the TCF Initiative. See Treating Customers Fairly,
supra note 160, at 11. In a 2006 report outlining the FSA's vision for the TCF Initiative, the role of
senior management in the TCF process is referred to 32 times. See generally id at 2-13 (describing
the various roles of senior management). Indeed, in stressing the importance of managerial
leadership to cultural change within firms, the FSA is at one with leading managerial theories of
culture and business practices. See, e.g., EDGAR H. SCHEIN, ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE AND
LEADERSHIP 11 (3d. 2004) (observing that "[i]t can be argued that the only thing of real importance
that leaders do is to create and manage culture; that the unique talent of leaders is their ability to
understand and work with culture; and that it is an ultimate act of leadership to destroy culture when
it is viewed as dysfunctional").
88
1 See Gilad, supra note 157, at 20.
' 89Although, in the case of the U.K., oligopolistic competition for many financial products
and services-combined with the fact that mis-selling claims have been alleged against a large crosssection of the financial services industry-is likely to have dampened its impact. Ultimately,
however, the impact of market discipline in this context is an empirical question which resides
beyond the scope of this paper.
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The process-oriented focus of the TCF Initiative thus provides a
platform for financial services firms to promote an organizational culture of
"other regarding" behavior. To realize this potential, however, the FCA
would do well to draw on the insights of cognitive and social psychology
canvassed in Part IV of this article.'" More specifically, while the TCF
Initiative is designed to facilitate dialogue regarding firm practices and the
outcomes they achieve for retail clients, the content and framing of these
conversations can be important determinants of organizational decisionmaking and behavior. Reframing these conversations to highlight their
ethical dimensions could, therefore, yield significant benefits. Thus, for
example, the FCA could provide guidance to the effect that meaningful
engagement with the TCF Initiative includes reviewing the results of
previous enforcement actions (i.e., those against other firms), thereby
highlighting the probability and magnitude of potential consequences and
providing the foundations of a "lessons learned" review of a firm's own
practices. It could similarly mandate that, as part of the vetting process for
new products and services, decision-makers confirm that they would
recommend purchase of the product or service in question to their
grandmother, parent or child (thus enhancing proximity)."'
The FCA could also mandate that all new financial products and
services be vetted and approved by an internal (sub-board level) "ethics"
committee-analogous to existing credit committees-headed by senior
management and responsible for, inter alia, overseeing delivery of the
outcomes identified by the TCF Initiative. The introduction of an ethics
committee would offer at least four potential benefits in this context. First, it
would signal to the lower rungs of the organization that treating customers
fairly (and "other regarding" behavior more generally) was not just a
compliance issue, but also an important business issue.'92 Second, it would
provide an opportunity for reflection-for sober second thought about the
impact of business decisions on client welfare.' Third, it would establish a
clear channel of accountability in terms of compliance with the TCF
Initiative, thus eliminating any organizational anonymity which might
otherwise decrease the moral intensity of ethical decisions.'94 Finally, it
would provide a direct means of monitoring compliance with ethical norms

90

See supra Part IV.

19'For these purposes, it would be useful (and perhaps necessary) to assume that the
grandmother, parent or child possessed the risk preferences of the "target" client.
192See Gilad, supra note 157, at 20.
See id. at 22-23.
94
1 See id. at 24.
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by employees.' As examined in greater detail in Part V, many of these
same benefits could also flow from the introduction of a boardlevel ethics
committee. '
Together, these and other mechanisms could potentially enhance
moral intensity within financial services firms and put ethical and business
considerations on a more equal footing. Moreover, they would allow
personal ethical commitments to be foregrounded, and their expression
legitimized. As a result, they would enable the personal ethical
commitments of employees and managers that are consistent with the TCF
Initiative to play a more prominent role in the formation of cultural norms
within financial firms.' 97
B. The Extended TCF Initiative
While further evidence regarding the impact of the TCF Initiative is
clearly needed, it is worthwhile exploring the potential merits (and
drawbacks) of extending this process-oriented regulatory strategy beyond its
current narrow focus on retail customers to encompass transactions involving
ostensibly more sophisticated counterparties.'" An "Extended" Treating
Counterparties Fairly ("Extended TCF") Initiative could apply to
transactions involving, for example, swaps and other over-the-counter
("OTC") derivatives, structured finance vehicles, structured investment
products, and other more exotic financial instruments.'" Like its retail
counterpart, the Extended TCF Initiative could contribute to the formation of
a more ethical culture within a segment of the financial services industry in
which it is widely perceived as lacking. Perhaps most importantly, it could

'95 See id. at 26.
See infra Part V.

197See Jones, supra note 85, at 366.
98
1n the U.K., COBS rules currently distinguish between retail clients, professional clients
and eligible (i.e., market) counterparties in accordance with, effectively, their ostensible level of
financial expertise and sophistication. See COBS, supra note 41, § 3.6. Per se eligible
counterparties include, inter alia, investment firms, credit institutions, insurance companies,
collective investment schemes, pension funds, governments, and central banks. Id. § 3.6.2. In
addition, a firm may treat a client as an eligible counterparty if, inter alia, the client is a body
corporate (including a limited liability partnership) which, together with its parent company or
subsidiaries, has called up share capital of at least £10 million. Id. § 3.6.4.
' 99We focus on primary markets for two related reasons. First, robust (i.e., transparent,
deep, and liquid) secondary markets can be expected to result in more accurate price discovery
which, in turn, is itself a tonic against opportunism. Second, in the view of many observers, the
most egregious cases of opportunism in recent years-and especially in connection with the GFChave occurred within the primary markets for these more esoteric, complex and thinly traded
instruments.

226

DELAWARE JOURNAL OF CORPORATE LAW

[Vol. 38

serve to deter the design and marketing of financial products and services
intended, either in whole or in part, to extract rents from less sophisticated
"sophisticated" counterparties.200
As with the TCF Initiative, regulators would need to identify the
regulatory objectives (or outcomes) an Extended TCF is designed to achieve.
These objectives would be tailored to the business context in which they
were applied and, therefore, necessarily would be somewhat different from
the objectives identified in the retail context. These objectives could
include, for example: (1) that the fair treatment of counterparties is
embedded in corporate culture; (2) that a counterparty discloses clearly and
openly all relevant information about a product which it is marketing; (3)
that a counterparty does not attempt to take any steps that could distort the
interpretation or weighting of the disclosed information; and (4) that a
counterparty does not market products that in its view a reasonably
sophisticated market participant would be unable to understand and/or price
accurately.
Led by senior management, firms would then be expected to take
responsibility for designing bespoke systems, processes, and controls to give
effect to these objectives. As with the retail TCF Initiative, the resulting
engagement and conversation, backed up by internal enforcement, would
facilitate the formation of an ethical culture that treats sophisticated
counterparties in accordance with the Extended TCF objectives and
legitimizes the expression of consistent personal ethical commitments.
The success of the Extended TCF Initiative, like the TCF Initiative,
would ultimately hinge on the extent to which financial services firms (and
their employees) meaningfully engage with regulatory outcomes.201 Once
again, a credible external enforcement threat, in relation to engagement as
well as outcomes, is key.202 So too is commitment on the part of senior
management.203 The introduction of an ethics committee to scrutinize
transactions and oversee engagement with the Extended TCF Initiative
would, for the reasons discussed above, also pay potential dividends.
Meanwhile, taking another page from cognitive and social psychology, the
FCA could require counterparties to transact "face-to-face" (i.e., either
physically or via teleconference) or otherwise attempt to reduce their

200See supra notes 46, 123 and accompanying text.
201

See, e.g., Principles-BasedRegulation: Focusing on the Outcomes that Matter, FIN.

SERVS. AUTH., 2 (Apr. 2007), availableat http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/principles.pdf (noting
that "[flirms' behaviour and positive engagement with the regulatory outcomes will also be a factor
that is taken into account in [the FCA's] regulatory action towards that firm").
202
See Treating Customers Fairly, supra note 160, at 9.
20
at 11.
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physical, psychological, or social proximity. While such proposals might
seem too costly, or unrealistic, or remnants of a bygone era, there is no
denying the fact-as evidenced by the heightened emotional response to the
footbridge problem 2 -that it is often more difficult to take advantage of
your counterparty once you have shaken their hand.
There are, however, a number of reasons to suggest that the Extended
TCF Initiative might not be as effective as its retail counterpart. Perhaps
most importantly, unlike the retail marketplace, there is arguably no
underlying societal norm that sophisticated market counterparties should be
treated fairly. Indeed, there is a strong countervailing norm of caveat emptor
within many wholesale markets."5 More specifically, where sophisticated
parties fail to fully understand the nature or extent of the risks they contract
to assume, the general view is thus that they have no one to blame but
themselves and should, accordingly, bear the consequences of their
ignorance, incompetence, and/or greed. Viewed from this perspective,
extending regulatory strategies such as the TCF Initiative to ostensibly more
sophisticated counterparties amounts to unwarranted paternalism. This, in
turn, is likely to dilute the impact of any reputational (i.e., market-based)
sanctions for firms which are deemed to have treated their counterparties
unfairly." Ultimately, however, such likely counterarguments arguably miss
the point. As Milton Friedman observed, efficiency demands that
contractual exchange is both voluntary and, importantly, informed."' The
Extended TCF Initiative must ultimately be judged on the basis ofwhether it
engenders the formation of cultural norms which would promote such
informed (and therefore more efficient) contracting.
V. WHO IS MY NEIGHBOR? CARVING OUT A ROLE FOR A MORE
ETHICAL CULTURE INSYSTEMIC RISK REGULATION

The GFC has driven home the reality that financial services firms
frequently do not possess the incentives to take systemic risk seriously.20

2

"See Valdesolo & DeSteno, supra note 95, at 476; Greene et al., supra note 99, at 2106;
Gold et al., supra note 95.
205
See Clive Adamson, Dir. of Supervision, Conduct Bus. Unit, Speech on the FCA at the
Bloomberg Conference: Conduct Supervision and the Move Towards the FCA (noting that the FCA
"will generally continue to rely on the caveat emptor principle and not seek to introduce concepts of
detriment and redress that we use in retail markets to wholesale markets").
206
1n response to the loss of reputational discipline, the regulator could deploy other
enforcement strategies. See infra notes 211-12 (discussing the "fit and proper purpose regime").
207
MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 13 (1962).
208

See, e.g., Jaime Caruana, Bankfor Int'l Settlements, Systemic Risk: How to Dealwith It?,

I (Feb. 12, 2010) availableat http://www.bis.org/publ/othp08.htm (noting that "[s]ystemic risk was
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While these firms, their shareholders, and their employees capture the
benefits derived from their socially excessive risk-taking, they bear only a
portion of the attendant costs. Indeed, of all the issues to emerge from this
crisis, the diversion of public resources to private firms in order to prevent
the collapse of the financial system remains the most acute and controversial.
The salient question thus becomes: can process-oriented regulation help
constrain socially excessive risk-taking within financial services firms? Put
differently: does the TCF Initiative's process-oriented approach provide a
template for what we might for argument's sake call a "Taking Externalities
Seriously" (or "TES") Initiative?209
A TES Initiative could identify and seek to achieve the following
regulatory objectives: (1) ensure that the identification and avoidance of
socially excessive risk-taking is embedded in corporate culture; (2) identify
and continually monitor any risks generated by the firm's activities which
manifest the potential to create or exacerbate systemic risk; (3) better
understand a firm's exposure to systemic risks; and (4) determine how best to
minimize these risks on an ongoing basis. These objectives would, inter
alia, engage firms in the important and difficult task of developing better
metrics of systemic risk-something which represents an ongoing challenge
for regulators.2 10 Importantly, where firm-level processes yielded significant
improvements in terms of the measurement or management of systemic risk,
these improvements could be disseminated by regulators in the form of
industry guidance thereby helping to overcome the inherent incentive
problems arising from the fact that financial stability is a public good.
Like the TCF Initiative, the TES Initiative would seek to make
socially excessive risk-taking a business and cultural issue for firms, with
compliance measured against both the delivery of desired regulatory
outcomes and ongoing engagement. Through internal engagement and
dialogue arising from the development and implementation of processes,
underestimated across the board before this crisis").
209For the present purposes, we bracket questions about the types of financial institutions to
which the TES Initiative should apply. One argument is that the TES Initiative should apply only to
systemically important firms, as it is only those institutions whose failure threatens to generate the
type of negative externalities unleashed by the GFC. There are, however, several arguments in favor
of more general application. First, a more targeted application does not take account of the potential
contagion effects of non-systemically important firms which engage insocially excessive risk-taking
in herds. Second, employees from firms not subject to the TES Initiative could relocate to firms
which were subject to it (and vice versa). Insofar as these employees were unfamiliar with the TES
Initiative, this might be expected to undermine attempts at norm formation within systemically
important institutions.
210
See Dimitrios Bisias et al., A Survey of Systemic Risk Analytics 46 (Office of Fin.
Research, Working Paper No. 0001, Jan. 5, 2012), available at http://www.treasury.gov/
initiatives/wsr/ofr/Documents/OFRwp0001_BisiasFloodLoValavanisASurveyOfSystemicRiskAnal
ytics.pdf.

B2WEEN LAW AND MARKms

20 13]

229

systems, and controls-backed by managerial commitment-the TES
Initiative would aim to foster the generation of a cultural norm within firms
that promotes awareness amongst all employees that their conduct has social
consequences. Awareness, of course, is not the same thing as understanding.
Individual actors, no matter how intelligent, are incapable of processing the
full systemic implications of their activities. Yet awareness that their actions
may have systemic implications may generate some individual restraint, as
well as encourage engagement with the processes, systems and controls
designed to manage these risks.
In effect, the processes, systems, controls, and norms generated by an
effective TES Initiative would result in firms internalizing some of the social
costs of their activities. On paper, therefore, the potential benefits of the
TES Initiative are compelling. But are they achievable? As a preliminary
matter, the conceptual problems associated with the design and
implementation of the TES Initiative would be significantly greater than
either the TCF Initiative or Extended TCF Initiative. While "fairness" is in
many respects an amorphous concept, it can readily be given more precise
content in the context of the bilateral customer or counterparty
relationships."' Socially excessive risk-taking, in contrast, is extremely
difficult to define, let alone identify before the moment it crystallizes as a
negative externality. These conceptual problems would undoubtedly render
it more difficult for regulators to provide meaningful firm-specific and
industry guidance. They would also make enforcement action stemming
from the failure to achieve desired regulatory outcomes inherently more
problematic."' These enforcement problems would be compounded by the
likely impotence of market-based (i.e., reputational) sanctions in response to
socially excessive risk-taking."'
Perhaps the most compelling response to these very legitimate
concerns is that, as described above, process-oriented regulation is designed
to promote engagement with desired regulatory outcomes and, through
engagement, to promote cultural norms that deter socially undesirable

21

As the six outcomes identified by the TCF Initiative attest. See Treating Customers

Fairly,supra
note 160, at 3.
2 12

Any uncertainty regarding the required regulatory standard could of course lead to legal
challenges. Moreover, in extremis- i.e., where the materialization of a risk will wipe out the assets
of the firm - we would expect the threat of ex post enforcement for failing to achieve desired
regulatory outcomes to have a negligible impact on ex ante incentives to take the risk (especially
where there was no recourse to the assets of the decision-makers). This is because in states of the
world where the risk materializes, the marginal costs of enforcement action would be zero.
23
mSee, e.g., Armour et al., supra note 135, at 3 (finding that news ofenforcement actions in
connection with wrongdoing which harmed third parties had a weakly positive effect on a firm's
share price).
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behavior.2 4 In the aftermath of the GFC, it cannot be denied that there is
such a thing as socially excessive risk-taking or that the externalities thereby
generated are very real. Nevertheless, it is inevitable that when dealing with
something as complex as socially excessive risk-taking, different firms (and
even regulators) will adopt divergent perspectives respecting, inter alia,
whether and to what extent various activities generate systemic risk and how
best to address it.
What process-oriented regulatory strategies such as the proposed TES
Initiative attempt to do is stimulate meaningful and ongoing dialogue within
firms about these important questions."' It then provides firms with the
flexibility to design and implement firm-specific processes which reflect the
results of this dialogic process."' Put simply, in a domain where there are
few right answers, the objective of the TES Initiative would be to engender a
culture in which firms continually question the impact of their activities on
others.217 Viewed in this light, any conceptual indeterminacy in terms of
desired regulatory outcomes would be unlikely to pose a significant obstacle
to such cultural formation.
Furthermore, although effective enforcement action would
undoubtedly be more problematic in connection with the TES (relative to the
TCF) Initiative, it bears emphasizing that enforcement action need not be
based solely on the failure to achieve outcomes, but also on the basis of the
firm's engagement with, and the level of commitment by senior management
to, achieving the regulatory outcomes."' Moreover, regulators could also
deploy indirect sanctions. Utilizing a holistic219 approved persons regime,220

214See supra

notes 159-60,

165 and accompanying text.

215See supra notes 176, 186 and accompanying text.

"See supra note 159 and accompanying text.

217See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
218See supra notes 148, 187 and accompanying text.

"Under such a regime, when presented with an approval request for a controlled function
(see note below), the FCA would consider the fitness of the applicant relative to the fitness and
competences of the board and management as a whole. The FCA has indicated that in considering
the competence of any applicant for a controlled function the competence of other approved persons
for that function will be relevant to ensure the institution has appropriate competences as a whole.
FSA, CONSULTATION PAPER 10/3, EFFECTIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: SIGNIFICANT
INFLUENCE CONTROLLED FUNCTIONS AND THE WALKER REvIEw § 4.28 (2010).
220Any person performing a "controlled function" of an authorized person must be
approved by the FCA. Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, 2000, c. 8, § 59(1) (U.K.). Such
person must be "a fit and proper person." Id. § 61(1). Controlled functions currently consist of
governing functions (for example, director or non-executive director function), significant
management functions, systems and control functions and required functions. FCA, FCA
HANDBOOK CHAPTER 10: APPROVED PERSONS § 10.4 (2013), available at
http://.info/FS/html/handbook/FCA/SUP/6. The FCA has recently proposed broadening the range of
control functions, a change that, although currently delayed, will enhance the FCA's control over the
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for example, a regulator could deny approval if the candidate did not have
the skills, qualities, or commitment necessary to counteract a firm's
ineffective engagement with the TES Initiative. Alternatively, regulators
could designate a candidate as "board-level champion" for the TES
Initiative."'
VI. TREATING BANKS DIFFERENTLY: PRECONDITIONS TO THE
EMERGENCE OF BINDING CULTURAL AND ETHICAL
CONSTRAINTS

The objective underlying the TCF, Extended TCF, and TES Initiatives
is to foster a more ethical culture within financial services firms. Yet, as the
GFC has illustrated, private incentives will at times come into conflict with
both pre-existing personal ethical commitments as well as the pursuit of
public regulatory objectives.222 It follows that, in order for a meaningful
ethical culture to form and flourish through process-oriented regulation, we
must first address these countervailing incentives. This section explores
some of the ways this might be achieved.
The U.K.'s experience with the TCF Initiative drives home the
importance of leadership and commitment on the part of senior management
as a necessary precondition to any shift toward a more ethical culture within
financial services firms. In this regard, if any stated commitment on the part
of senior managers is not backed up by observable action to implement the
TCF, Extended TCF, and TES Initiatives (and then monitor and enforce
compliance), it is highly unlikely that the desired "cultural shift" will take
place.223 However, whereas employees will observe and easily interpret
mixed managerial signals, regulators may struggle to differentiate between
managerial (unequivocal) word and (equivocal) action. Managers may,
therefore, be able to creatively comply through ostensible engagement that
ultimately has limited impact on the ground. Clearly then, managerial
incentives are central to the success of the initiatives.
There are two key drivers of the incentive structures of senior
managers. The first driver is personal compensation arrangements, where
those arrangements are linked directly or indirectly to financial targets. The
second is managers' relationship with shareholders and, ultimately,

personnel and board structure of financial institutions. FSA, IMPLEMENTATION

OF THE NEW

SIGNIFICANT INFLUENCE CONTROLLED FUNCTIONS (SIFs) DEFERRED (2011).
mSee Treating Customers Fairly, supra note 164, at 3.3 (noting that some firms have

designated a board-level champion for the TCF Initiative).
222
See supra notes 23-28 and accompanying text.
223
See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
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shareholder value. Shareholders in financial institutions, as in other firms,
possess strong incentives to encourage managers to focus on value
creation.224 Within systemically important financial institutions, however,
these same incentives also drive shareholders to encourage managers to take
socially excessive risks.225 As has been argued elsewhere, where creditors do
not discipline institutions that benefit from the TBTF subsidy and where the
state does not demand full payment for its implicit guarantee, 26 shareholders,
including long-term shareholders, have powerful incentives to encourage
managers to increase the volatility and, therefore, riskiness of the institution's
asset profile." That is, encouraging managers to "bet the bank" is rational
for shareholders who think only about the value of their own portfolio.
Accordingly, to increase the probability that measures such as the TCF,
Extended TCF, and TES Initiatives will succeed, managers need to be given
room to resist shareholder pressure to focus only on shareholder value.
What, then, are the remuneration and other governance tools available
to create the decision-making space necessary to enable a more ethical
culture-institutionalized through measures such as the TCF, Extended
TCF, and TES Initiatives-to flourish? Below we canvass a range of
possible strategies.2 Some of these strategies-remuneration and corporate
objective regulation, for example-may be viewed as pre-requisites.229
Others, meanwhile, may be more appropriately viewed as facilitative but,
ultimately, optional. Moreover, certain of these optional governance
strategies may be viewed as, at least in part, substitutable; the absence of one
may be counterbalanced by the presence of another. Accordingly, whether
any particular jurisdiction creates governance structures that provide fertile
soil for our proposals must be assessed holistically. Such comparative
jurisdictional assessments are beyond the scope of this article.
A. Composition Reforms: A BoardLevel Ethics Committee
An important question raised by the GFC is whether weaknesses in
the structure and composition of the boards of directors of financial

224See supra note 16 and accompanying text.

22sSee supranotes 141-45 and accompanying text.
...
See JOSEPH NOSS & RHIANNON SOWERBUTr, BANK OF ENGLAND, FINANCIAL
PAPER No. 15, THE IMPLICIT SUBSIDY OF BANK (2012), available at
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/fsr/fs_paperl 5.pdf.
227See Christopher M. Bruner, Corporate Governance Reform in a Time of Crisis, 36 J.
CORP. L. 309, 312 (2011).
228
See infra Parts VI.B-E.
229
See infra Parts VI.B-C.
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institutions were a proximate cause of their failure. The focus to date has
been on the competences of independent non-executive directors-i.e.,
whether they were sufficiently knowledgeable about their firms and the
financial services industry-and the role of the board in effectively
managing risk.230 The primary regulatory response in this regard has been to
require or recommend that financial institutions (i.e., banks and other "credit
institutions") form board-level risk committees under the control of
independent directors.23 '
To date, ethics and culture have not been featured in this board
composition debate. In the U.K., for example, the important Walker Review
on the CorporateGovernance in UK Banks and otherFinancialEntities did
not address ethics or envision a specific role for boards with regard to firm
ethical culture.232 Nevertheless, many U.K. companies, including financial
institutions, do have (and had prior to the crisis) board committees whose
remit it is to address firm ethics.233 It is important to keep in mind, however,
the limits to board composition reforms in general. In the case of the major
bank failures during the crisis, for example, it is unlikely that such reforms
would have prevented the bank failures in question or, indeed, have altered
the board composition of many of those failed banks.234
Nevertheless, the role of a board-level ethics committee within
financial institutions is worth canvassing in the post-crisis board composition

230See, e.g., DAVID WALKER, A REVIEW OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN U.K. BANKS
AND OTHER FINANCIAL INDUSTRY ENTITLES: FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS 14, 19 (2009), available

at http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http:/www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/walker-review
261109.pdf (recommending that non-executive directors "have the knowledge and understanding of
the business to enable them to contribute effectively").
231See, e.g., BCBS, PRINCIPLES FOR ENHANCING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 52 (2010),
availableat http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsl 76.pdf (suggesting a board-level risk committee for banks
which would be "responsible for advising the board on the bank's overall current and future risk
tolerance/ appetite and strategy, and for overseeing senior management's implementation of that
strategy"); FCA, SENIOR MANAGEMENT ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS AND CONTROLS

§ 21.1.5

(2013) ("The FCA [suggests] that . . . firms should consider establishing a governing body risk
committee to provide focused support and advice on risk governance.").
232See generally WALKER, supra note 230, at 14-18 (focusing on how the board will
provide business awareness).
233

See DAVID WALKER, A REVIEW OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN U.K. BANKS AND
OTHER FINANCIAL INDUSTRY ENTITIES: CONSULTATION DOCUMENT 128 (2009), available at

http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.hmtreasury.gov.uk/d/walker review con
sultation_ 160709.pdf (reporting a review by Deloitte indicating that 33% of Banks-as compared to
40% of all companies-as of 2008 had a committee that dealt with issues of
"CSR/Environment/Ethics/Health & Safety"). The remit of such committees is, of course,
considerably wider than the issues considered in this paper.
234

See, e.g., THE ROYAL BANK OF SCOTLAND, ANNUAL REPORT AND ACCOUNTS 2 (2006),

available at http://www.investors.rbs.com/download/report/RBSplc-Accounts 2006.pdf (listing
the bank's pre-crisis board of directors).
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debate. An ethics committee could form a key component of an attempt to
generate an "other regarding" ethical culture within financial institutions. As
we have seen, the process-orientated strategies place significant weight on
the role played by senior management. An ethics committee, on which
executive and non-executive directors sit and to which senior management
reports, would be vital in: (1) signaling to management and all employees
the importance of the formation of an ethical culture; and (2) establishing
effective monitoring, reporting, and other mechanisms to oversee its design
and implementation.
Working together with senior management, an ethics committee
would take the lead in establishing and revising a firm's cultural/ethical
objectives consistent with applicable regulatory objectives, including those
identified by the TCF, Extended TCF, and TES Initiatives.235 More
specifically, an ethics committee would be responsible for setting the firmspecific ethical outcomes and then monitoring the processes developed by
management and employees, and benchmarking their effects in practice and
over time.236 An ethics committee could also be responsible for putting in
place and monitoring the effectiveness of ethical disciplinary procedures
within the firm and for overseeing the management information systems that
gather information about engagement and compliance with the processes and
procedures designed to engender a more ethical culture.
Because the generation of an ethical culture is both an operational and
monitoring issue (the goal being to infuse ethical considerations into
institutional activities), such a committee would consist of both executive
and non-executive directors. However, as its key function would be to hold
management accountable for their leadership and engagement with the
Initiatives, the ethics committee would be majority controlled by the nonexecutive directors.
B. Remuneration
The view is now widespread that one of the primary drivers of socially
excessive risk-taking within financial institutions prior to the GFC was the
remuneration arrangements of both executive directors and lower level
bankers and traders. These arrangements incentivized decision-making that

235See
supra note 160 and accompanying text.
236

As a board-level committee it could not, however, be closely involved in the design and
implementation of the processes necessary to achieve these objectives. As discussed above, of
central importance to process-oriented regulation is harnessing the firm's ground-level knowledge
and expertise, and making engagement with regulatory objectives a central part of a firm's ethos.
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focused on short-term financial gains (often unrealized in cash terms).
Indeed, in many instances, financial institutions appear to have remunerated
managers and other employees by taking account of the short-term upside of
transactions, but not the potential long-term downside.237 In the wake of the
crisis, domestic and transnational regulatory responses"' have thus focused
on ensuring that: (1) pay more accurately reflects both short-term and longerterm risks; (2) there are limits on the performance-based component ofpay;
(3) any performance-based component has a limited cash component; and (4)
a substantial portion of performance-based pay is deferred over a significant
period of time (i.e., over three to five years)."'
Even where remuneration arrangements are linked to the long-term
value of the firm, however, these arrangements may still generate incentives
to cut ethical corners. To the extent that firms profit from the exploitation of
asymmetries of information and expertise in relation to highly complex
products such actions impose costs on their less informed and/or inexpert
counterparties, thereby generating quasi-rents. In relation to socially
excessive risk-taking, meanwhile, the long-term outlook of the financial
institution may support an approach to risk that, from society's perspective, is
clearly undesirable. Specifically, if the primary objective of financial

237

See generally Lucian A. Bebchuk & Holger Spamann, Regulating Bankers Pay, 98
GEo. L. J. 247(2010) (examining and suggesting alternatives to compensation structures that
focused on short-term results and encouraged excessive risk-taking); see also Coffee, supra note 30,
at 1047 ("Because a rapid shift towards incentive-based compensation at financial institutions
focused senior management on short-term results, longer-term risks were ignored or excessively
discounted.").
238
See, e.g., COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, COMMISSION
RECOMMENDATION ON REMUNERATION POLICIES IN THE FINANCIAL SERVICES SECTOR (2009),
available at http://ec.europa.eu/intemal-market/company/does/directors-remun/financialsector
290409 en.pdf ("Remuneration policy should be in line with the business strategy, objectives,
values and long-term interest of the financial undertaking . . . ."); COMMITTEE OF EUROPEAN

BANKING SUPERVISORS, GUIDELINES ON REMUNERATION POLICIES AND PRACTICES (2010),
availableat http://www.eba.europa.eu/cebs/media/Publications/Standards%20and%2Guidelines/
2010/Remuneration/Guidelines.pdf; FDIC, FIL-7-2011 (It is . . . appropriate to specify clear
principles on sound remuneration to ensure that the structure of remuneration does not encourage
excessive risk-taking by individuals or moral hazard and is aligned with the risk appetite, values and
long-term interests of the credit institution or investment firm."); INTERAGENCY NOTICE OF
PROPOSED RULEMAKING: INCENTIVE- BASED COMPENSATION ARRANGEMENTS (2011), available
at http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/financial/2011/filll007.pdf ("This [Notice on Proposed
Rulemaking] seeks to strengthen the incentive compensation practices at covered institutions by
better aligning employee rewards with longer-term institutional objectives."); SENIOR
MANAGEMENT ARRANGEMENTS, supra note 235, § 19A ("Afirm must ensure that its remuneration
policy is in line with the business strategy, objectives, values and long term interest of thefirm.").
239
See SENIOR MANAGEMENT ARRANGEMENTS, supra note 231, § 19A.3.49. Note that
these standards are applied on a "firm-wide" basis and are therefore applicable to executive directors
as well as bankers and traders.
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institutions, as organizations, is to generate shareholder value (which we
discuss further below) then rational managers acting in the interests of their
shareholders will exploit the implicit and uncosted state guarantee.240
As a result, maximizing shareholder value will support an approach
that promotes excessive risk-taking, ultimately transferring value from the
state to shareholders. If the risks pay off shareholders win; if they do not,
society loses.24 ' Requiring employees to maximize a firm's value within a
three to five year time frame (as the new remuneration rules and guidelines
effectively require) will thus not necessarily place a break on socially
excessive risk-taking.
In theory, claw-back provisions hold out greater potential to alter the
incentives of senior managers and other employees. Correctly drafted, clawbacks can ensure that the costs generated by socially excessive risks are
borne not just by society, but also by the individuals who actually took them.
The devil of such claw-backs, however, is in the detail. Do they apply to
paid or merely deferred remuneration? If the former, how far is the lookback period in relation to which the claw-back can be applied? What is the
extent of prior earnings which must be re-paid? Claw-backs of the variety
set forth in the FCA's Remuneration Code,242 which apply only to unvested
deferred remuneration, incentivize rational managers and employees to
discount only the deferred benefit of the socially excessive risk-taking by the
probability that the risks will be realized within the vesting timeframe.243 In
these behavioral calculations, we would expect the senior managers or
employees to also take into account the benefits of any increase in fixed (and
non-recoverable) salary, as well as job security, arising from risking-taking
aligned with broader institutional incentives. Compounding matters,
financial institutions may attempt to realign incentives by simply increasing
fixed pay.
The Dodd-Frank Act, in contrast, authorizes the FDIC to impose clawbacks on senior executives who are "substantially responsible" for bank
failure.2 " On one level, the FDIC claw-backs are broader than those

240
See Coffee, supra note 30, at 1053; see generally Noss & Sowerbutts, supra note 230
(examining public costs of the implicit government guarantee).
24 1
See Coffee, supra note 30, at 1048.

242See SENIOR MANAGEMENT ARRANGEMENTS, supranote 231,

§ 19A.3.52

(providing for

the reduction "unvested deferred" remuneration in the event of "employee misbehaviour", or where a
business unit suffers a "material downturn in [firm] financial performance" or "a material failure of
risk management").
243
See id §l9A.3.52-53.
244Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §203(s), 124 Stat. 1376, 1514 (2010). In the
event of bank bailout, the FDIC would not be appointed as receiver. There remain doubts about the
legality of this provision. See Dorothy Shapiro, FederalizingFiduciaryDuty: The Altered Scope of
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provided for under FCA rules insofar as they apply to all compensation."
On another level, however, they are narrower in that they (1) focus on
personal rather than collective (i.e., business unit) responsibility and (2) only
apply when a bank is in FDIC receivership.246 Furthermore, the FDIC rules
will only apply to compensation earned within one to two years of the
appointment of the FDIC as receiver."' A rational manager would therefore
discount the benefit of risky behavior against the probability that such risks
will result in receivership in a one to two year period (as well as the
probability that the FDIC will be able to establish "substantial
responsibility"). As the crisis has demonstrated, however, holding individual
managers accountable is very difficult. Moreover, for systemically important
banks, the probability of even entering an insolvency proceeding is low. As
such, the probability of claw-back under these rules is also low.
The personal and institutional incentives of senior managers and other
employees subject to the reformed remuneration rules manifest the potential
to crowd out a process-oriented approach to cultural and ethical norm
formation. Within such an environment, there is a risk that measures such as
the TCF, Extended TCF, and TES Initiatives would be reduced to ethical
window dressing. At the same time, it has now become relatively
commonplace for companies to include non-financial targets such as
employee satisfaction, health and safety, and environmental measures
alongside financial measures in executive remuneration arrangements."
Indeed, the U.K. FCA's Remuneration Code states that "[n]on-financial
performance metrics should form a significant part of the performance
assessment process . . . . [these non-financial risk metrics include] risk

management and compliance with the regulatory system . . . ."249 Indeed,
some financial institutions have voluntarily gone further than this. Morgan
Stanley, for example, has recently altered the provisions in its remuneration
arrangements with senior managers to enable claw-backs where, inter alia,
there af violations of articulated ethical standards.250 Such non-financial
Officer FiduciaryDuty Following OrderlyLiquidationunderDodd-Frank, 17 STAN. J.L. Bus. &
FIN. 223, 226.
245
See Dodd-Frank Act § 203(s).
246
See id
247
ld
24 8
See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION: REVIEW OF THE YEAR

2009 70-71 (2010), availableathttp://www.pwc.co.uk/assets/pdf/executive-compensation-reviewof-the-year-2009-pwc.pdf.
249SENIOR MANAGEMENT ARRANGEMENTS, supranote 231,

§ 19A.3.37.

250See Morgan Stanley, Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), 28-29 (Apr. 5,2012), availableat
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/895421/000119312512151028/d303252ddefl4a.htm. See
generally Sharlene Goff & Daniel Schtifer, Banks Ready to Claw Back More Bonuses, FIN. TIMES

(London), Aug. 27, 2012, availableat http://ft.com (search title) (discussing how "recent scandals
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targets could be extended to explicitly incorporate the level of engagement,
implementation, and compliance with the TCF, Extended TCF, and TES
Initiatives. Building on the role of ethics committees noted above, and the
existing role of risk committees vis-a-vis remuneration,25 1 the ethics
committee could take responsibility for setting such non-financial
remuneration targets. Furthermore, by connecting remuneration to the
performance of a collective part of the financial institution-a product group,
business unit, or division, for example-remuneration could drive peer
group monitoring, thereby strengthening two of the three pillars of norm
formation: the observation and dissemination of information about the
violation of cultural norms.
C. CorporateLaw: The Objective ofBank Activity
There is a longstanding debate regarding in whose interests a company
should be run-i.e., whose interests should directors consider when they
make decisions."' Many argue that directors should be required to take into
account the interests of all corporate stakeholders when they act without any
legal direction to prioritize one constituency over another.253 This approach
is referred to by commentators as a "pluralistic" or "multiple-interest" model
of the corporation.254
Several justifications have been given for this approach. For example,
some commentators, observing that the corporate form is a "gift" from the
state and that corporations exert enormous influence over all our lives, have
argued that with great power comes quasi-public responsibility to consider
the interests of all stakeholders."' Economicjustifications, meanwhile, focus
on the incentives for firm-specific human capital investments by employees
which are generated by knowing that their interests count as much as anyone
else's.256 Whether or not one is persuaded by such arguments more
in the sector . . . and mis-selling of financial products to anti-money laundering failures and
sanctions breaches - are prompting big banks to increasingly strip staff of awards they received for
past performances that no longer look favourable").
251

See, e.g., SENIOR MANAGEMENT ARRANGEMENTS,

supra note 231,

§

21.1.5(f)

(suggesting that "the firm's governingbody ... should consider establishing a governing body risk
committee to provide focused support and advice on risk governance").
252DAVID

2012).

KERSHAW, COMPANY LAW IN CONTEXT: TEXT AND MATERIALS 357 (2d ed.

generally id. at 357-78 (discussing commentators' perspectives regarding
shareholder and stakeholder interests as comprising a company's interests).
254
See id at 370.
253See

255See E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom are CorporateManagers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L.

REV. 1145, 1149 (1932).
256
See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team ProductionTheory of CorporateLaw,
85 VA. L. REV. 247,272 (1999).
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generally-given the stark consequences of the GFC and the necessity for
publicly funded bail-outs-the case for a multiple-interest model in relation
to financial institutions is compelling. At the very least, there is a powerful
justification in relation to systemically important institutions for a model that
gives equal weighting to the interests of customers (depositors,
counterparties, etc.), shareholders, and broader society.
A form of the multiple-interest model is essential for creating the
conditions in which the TCF, Extended TCF, and TES Initiatives can
facilitate the formation of a more ethical culture. All actors, from the board
down to the individual trader, need to know that when there is a conflict
between regulatory objectives and the pursuit of value that it is lawful,
legitimate, and expected that they will prioritize fair treatment or the
avoidance of potential externalities.
Managerial leadership and
commitment-an essential pre-requisite to the formation and enforcement of
cultural norms-will manifestly be undermined if the law's core statement of
the directors' obligations fails to take account of the "other regarding"
obligations that are foundational to achieving this objective. Furthermore,
the imposition of a legal obligation to make decisions on the basis of an
"other regarding" standard may assist managers in managing, and at times
resisting, shareholder pressure to take excessive risks.
In most jurisdictions, this pre-requisite to the formation of a more
ethical culture is unproblematic because all corporations are subject to a
multiple interest model of corporate purpose. This is the case, for example,
for firms incorporated in New York, Germany, or Austria.257 The U.K.,
however, is one jurisdiction where this is not the case. This is because, in
the U.K., directors' duties require them to act in a way in which that they
consider will promote shareholder interests.258 Indeed, it is worthwhile
noting in this regard that the Walker Review rejected the suggestion that the
existing duty should be amended to reflect the fact that banks are different."'
Encouragingly, however, recent remarks by a former CEO of the FSA on the

257

See N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §717(b) (2010); AUS. STOCK CORP. LAW §70(1) (2013). In
Germany, while the Stock Corporation Act is silent on the question of corporate objectives, it is
widely accepted that the management board should act in the interests of shareholders, employees
and society at large. Wolfgan Hefermehl & Gerald Spindler, in 3 Mdnchener Kommentar zum
Aktiengesetz 58, § 76/53 (Bruno Kropff & Johannes Semler eds., Beck, 2d ed. 2004).
258
Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, § 172. Whilst the provision requires that directors have
regard to other stakeholders, the provision isclear that the decision itself must prioritize the interests
of the shareholders. See id.
25
9See WALKER REVIEW, supra note 230, at 138.
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subject of banking culture suggest that U.K. regulators may be open to the
idea of revisiting this issue."
D. CorporateLaw: ShareholderRights
One needs to be wary of overstating the importance of the corporate
purpose debate. Through an instrumental lens, even if given discretion to act
in the interests of multiple constituencies, it seems probable that the
constituency to whom directors and managers will be compelled to answer
will be the constituency whose interests they prioritize in the case of conflict
between shareholder value and other stakeholder interests. That is, the
background structure of shareholder rights will continue to influence
decision-making within financial institutions. However, whilst in all
jurisdictions shareholders have the power to appoint, remove, and (not) reappoint directors, they are not equal when it comes to the nature and extent
of shareholder rights."' As a result, the effects those rights have on senior
management and firm decision-making and behavior may also differ.
In the U.K., for example, shareholders have very powerful rights.
They have the non-waivable right to remove directors without cause by
passing a simple majority resolution," along with the right to call a meeting
at any time when five percent of the shareholder body instructs the board to
call a meeting." By way of contrast, in the U.S., although the rules vary
from state to state, most financial institutions may select jurisdictions which
permit weaker removal rights. A firm incorporated in Delaware, for
example, can elect to have a classified board where the directors have three
year terms and can only be removed with cause' during this term.'

260

Hector Sants, Chief Executive, FSA, Speech to the Chartered Inst. of Secs.& Invs.
Conference: Do Regulators Have a Role to Play in Judging Culture and Ethics? (June 17, 2010)
(transcript available at http//www.fsa.gov.uk/libry/communication/speeches/2010/0617 hs.shtml)
(stating that the corporate purpose objective must include "a stronger and more explicit obligation to
wider society").
261
Compare DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 141(k) (2010) ("Any director or the entire board of
directors may be removed, with or without cause, by the holders of a majority of the shares then
entitled to vote at an election of directors, except as [provided under subsections (1) or (2)]."), with
Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, § 168(1) ("A company may by ordinary resolution at a meeting remove
a director before the expiration of his period of office, notwithstanding anything in any agreement
between it and him.").
262
See Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, § 168.
6
1 1See id. §§ 303-05.
264
See Campbell v. Loews, Inc., 134 A.2d 852, 857 (Del. Ch. 1957) (The "cause" threshold
is a high one in effect requiring some form of breach of duty or illegality).
265
See tit. 8, § 141(k). Note that the "with cause" removal right is itself a default rule that
can be amended by amending the certificate of incorporation. See id.
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Furthermore, shareholders of a Delaware company will only have the right to
call an interim shareholder meeting where the charter or bylaws authorize
them to do S0.266 In Germany, meanwhile, the supervisory board directors
may be removed at any time without cause, but the removal threshold is a
supermajority (75%), making removal difficult in practice.267
Recent empirical work suggests that this predicted relationship
between shareholder rights and the behavior of financial institutions is very
real indeed.268 Ferreira, Kershaw, Kirchmaier, and Schuster construct a
"management insulation index" (MII) and apply this index to all U.S. banks
to measure the extent and variation in shareholder rights.269 They then
regress MII index scores against, inter alia, data on which banks were
bailed-out through the U.S. Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP).2 70
TARP is viewed by the authors as a proxy for a bank's pre-crisis
susceptibility to failure and an arguable proxy for excessive risk-taking.2 71
They find that banks which were less insulated were more likely to be bailed
out.2 72 For Ferriera et al. the most compelling explanation for the
relationship between managerial insulation and bank failure is that the banks
which are subject to stronger shareholder rights would be more susceptible
to shareholder pressure to take excessive risks and, therefore, more likely to
fail. 273 This generates what would be for many commentators and
policymakers a counterintuitive result:for banks stronger, and not weaker,
shareholder rights are a problem.274
For our purposes, this suggests that where directors of financial
institutions are subject to powerful shareholder rights, then the ethical
cultural objectives are likely to be subordinated. This effect will be more
powerful when strong shareholder rights and pressure are combined with a
corporate objective that prioritizes shareholder interests.275 However, even
when a bank is subject to a multiple-interest rule, as Ferriera et al.'s U.S.

266Id. § 21 (d).
267Aktiengesetz [AktG] [Stock Corporation Act], Sep. 6, 1965, BGBl. I § 103 (Ger.).
268See Daniel Ferreira et al., ShareholderEmpowerment andBank Bail Outs
24 (2012),

availableat http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2170392.
2 69
See id. at 5.
270

See id. at 13.
id. at 24.

271
See
272

See Ferreira et al., supra note 268, at 2.
See id at 25.
274See Reint Gropp & Matthias K6hler, Bank Owners orBank Managers: Who is Keen on
273

Risk? Evidence from the FinancialCrisis 4 (European Bus. Sch., Research Paper No. 10-02, Feb.

23, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1555663
different approach but reaching some similar conclusions).
275See Gropp & Kohier, supra note 274, at 22.
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study shows, such rights may drive behavior that disregards non-shareholder
concerns."' It follows that where there are more powerful shareholder rights,
managers' commitment to the implementation of the TCF, Extended TCF,
and TES Initiatives is likely to be more muted, thus undermining their
potential effectiveness. This suggests that to create space for norm
formation through the TCF, Extended TCF, and TES Initiatives regulators
will need to tack against the prevailing consensus that banks should be
subject to stronger, not weaker, shareholder rights.2" It also suggests that,
ceteris paribus, the U.S. and Germany provide more fertile soil for the
initiatives than, for example, the U.K.
E. CorporateLaw: The Duty of Care
We have considered the ways in which an ethical culture could be
connected to remuneration and other governance arrangements which
incentivize senior managers to commit to measures such as the TCF,
Extended TCF, and TES Initiatives and to insulate them, to a degree, from
pressures to pursue shareholder value. But as managerial leadership is
central to the success of these strategies, we also need to consider the role
that the threat of potential liability might play.
Imposing liability upon directors for failing to take due care in the
implementation of the TCF, Extended TCF, and TES Initiatives would be
one approach to incentivizing managerial leadership."' At the same time,
the well-trodden debate about the duty of care in the Anglo-American
context shows that regulators need to be wary of imposing care expectations
on directors.279 Where the standards are too high, directors will be fearful
that carefully taken but unsuccessful decisions, or careful supervision that
failed to identify non-compliant behavior, will ex-post and with the benefit
of hindsight be judged unfavorably." As a result, directors may either
refuse to serve or take an excessively risk-averse approach toward the
generation, monitoring, and enforcement of the relevant processes, systems,
and controls.

276See Ferreira et al., supra note 268, at 25.
277
See Gropp & K6hler, supranote 274, at 22.
278See Sants, supra note 260 ("Behaviour is influenced by leadership, strategy, decisions,

incentives, controls and the threat of sanctions: deterrence.").
279
See Bernard S. Black et al., Outside DirectorLiability, 58 STAN. L. REv. 1055,1122-34
(2006).
280

See John Armour & Jeffrey N. Gordon, Systemic Harms and the Limits ofShareholder

Value Part IV.G. 1 (Oct. 2012) (on file with the authors).
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It is this policy concern that explicitly informs Delaware corporate law
with its gross negligence standard for the duty of care."' This standard is
violated only where it can be shown that directors were "recklessly
indifferent" to the interests of the corporation m or, in relation to internal
controls, that there was "a sustained or systematic failure of the board to
exercise oversight-such as an utter failure to attempt to assure a reasonable
information and reporting system exists. .. ."I" Perhaps, as John Armour
and Jeffrey Gordon have recently argued, the policy concerns that underpin
Delaware's duty of care jurisprudence are less weighty in economic contexts
such as banking where risk-taking is necessary and socially desirable but
where, simultaneously, such risk-taking threatens to generate significant
negative externalities." In such contexts, dampening executive directors'
incentives to take risks may represent a more defensible policy objective.""
For our purposes, if regulators make this election in favor of a more
demanding standard of care, this could play a role in incentivizing managers
to meaningfully engage with the TCF, Extend TCF, and TES Initiatives and,
thereby, help foster a more ethical culture.
In the U.K., higher care standards are already in place, although the
probability of their enforcement is generally thought to be very low."' The
U.K. standard of care is that of a hypothetical reasonable average director
where if the actual director in question has above average skills and
experience the hypothetical director is imbued with those above average
skills and experience."
It is worth briefly examining how the TCF, Extended TCF, and TES
Initiatives could interact with this general standard. In order to understand

2
"See, e.g., Gagliardi v. Trifoods, Int'l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1052 (Del. Ch. 1996) ("[I]t is
in the shareholders' economic interest to offer sufficient protection to directors from liability for
negligence, etc., to allow directors to conclude that, as a practical matter, there isno risk that, if they
act in good faith and meet minimal proceduralist standards of attention, they can face liability as a
result of a business loss."). Note further in this regard that most Delaware corporations benefit from
a complete liability waiver for duty of care violations which is permitted pursuant to section
102(b)(7) of the Delaware General Corporation Law. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2011).
282
See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 750 (Del. Ch. 2005),
reprintedin 31 DEL. J.CORP. L. 349, 418 (2006).
"'Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369 (Del. 2006); In re Citigroup Inc. S'holder Derivative
Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 122 (Del. Ch. 2009); In reCaremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959,
971 (Del. Ch. 1996).
24
1 See Armour & Gordon, supra note 280, Part II.A.
2
"See id, Part 1.
"'See John Armour, Enforcement Strategiesin UK. CorporateGovernance:A Roadmap
andEmpiricalAssessment21(European Corporate Governance Inst., Working PaperNo. 106/2008,
Apr. 2008), availableat http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1 133542.
287
See Companies Act, 2006, § 174.
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the expectations generated by the care standard, recent Australian case lawapplying a reasonable average director standard 288-has begun to draw on the
best practice guidance set forth in both corporate governance codes and trade
association guidelines. 289 These sources are used to identify the functions
and context-specific expectations of directors when determining whether
they have taken reasonable care. For example, in AustralianSecurities and
Investments Commission (ASIC) v. Rich2"' the court took into account
observations on the roles of directors in U.K. reports on board composition
regulation"' and a report from the British Confederation of Industry on the
responsibilities of British public companies."' More recently, the court in
ASIC v. Healej2 drew on materials produced by the Australian Institute for
Directors respecting the director's role vis-6-vis financial statements in order
to understand the role and function of non-executive directors in relation to
financial reports.294
Following the lead of these Australian cases, guidelines and rules
about a director's function and role can be used by courts to flesh out the
substantive content of the duty of care. It can be argued, therefore, that
where the TCF, Extended TCF, and TES Initiatives place explicit
obligations on executive directors to spearhead implementation, a failure to
take such duties seriously-as a reasonable average director would take
them--could expose directors to personal liability. Similarly, if the nonexecutive directors serving on our proposed ethics committee failed to
perform their oversight role with due care, they could find themselves in
breach of their care obligation.
Of course, in any jurisdiction where a high standard of care is
adopted, the extent to which it would incentivize executive and nonexecutive directors to take their obligations under the TCF, Extended TCF,
and TES Initiatives seriously will be a function not only of the standard of
care and its interaction with the initiatives, but also of the probability that
any breach will be enforced by either the company, a shareholder or, as is
possible in Australia, by the regulator. However, it is beyond this article's
scope to address these broader corporate law issues. Furthermore, even in
jurisdictions where the standard of care is demanding and the probability of

288

See Australian Corporations Act § 180 (2001).
289See
Austl. Sec. & Inv. Comm'n v Healey [2011] FCA 717, $ 192 (Austl.) (2003).
290
1d
291
see DEREK HIGGS, REVIEw OF THE ROLE AND EFFECTIVENESS OF NON-EXECUTIVE
DIRECTORS 97-104 (2003), available at http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/higgsreport.pdf
' 92See [2003] NSWC 85, IN 69-7 1.
93
2 See [2011] FCA 717, M 194-96.
294
See id. 1 194.

BETwEEN LAWANDMARKETS

2013]

245

enforcement high, one would not expect to see many cases where directorswhether executive or non-executive-are found personally liable." Indeed,
actual director liability is very rare in all jurisdictions."" Of course, this does
not mean that the threat of liability would not influence behavior."'
VII.

CONCLUSION

There is little doubt that, for better or worse, culture and ethics play an
important role in the governance of financial services firms."' There is less
consensus, however, surrounding the question of whether, or to what extent,
the law or markets can (or should) be utilized to generate meaningful cultural
and/or ethical constraints in pursuit of broader social objectives.'" When
financial markets were on a seemingly endless upwards trajectory, the
question was not a pressing one. In the wake of the GFC, however, it has
justifiably been the subject of renewed focus.
This paper has canvassed some of the ways which we might seek to
engender a more ethical culture within the financial services industry."o'
More specifically, it has illustrated how process-oriented regulation,
combined with more radical restructuring of the internal governance
arrangements of financial institutions, could be leveraged to achieve this
laudable objective. Ultimately, however, there are no easy answers; no
quick fixes. Nevertheless, public support from across the political spectrum,
along with the stated commitment of financial leaders themselves, has
created the opportunity for reform, and it should be taken.

295
Even in Australia, where these two preconditions are arguably applicable - particularly
because ASIC has the power to enforce breaches of duty - we still do not see higher levels of
director liability. In ASIC v. Healey for example, although the directors were found in breach, no
financial penalty was imposed upon them. See [2011] FCA 717, 583 (finding directors liable for
failing to take reasonable steps to read and understand financial statements). But see Austl. Sec. &
Inv. Comm'n v Healey (No. 2) [2011] FCA 1003,
190-91 (AustL) (holding the majority of
directors financially liable only for the plaintiffs costs incidental to the proceeding).
296
See Black et al., supra note 279, at 1059-60.
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Both positively in ensuring that the TCF, Extended TCF, and TES Initiatives are taken
seriously and negatively insofar as skilled executive and non-executive directors refuse to serve.
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See supra Part[I.C.
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